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In many existing markets demanders wish to buy more than one unit from a group of 
identical units of a commodity. Often, the units are sold simultaneously by auction. The 
vast majority of literature pertaining to the economics of auctions, however, considers en-
vironments in which demanders buy at most one object. In this dissertation we present 
a collection of results concerning the generalization of theoretical and experimental results 
from environments in which buyers have single-unit demands to environments with two-unit 
demands. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a set of bidding strategies to be 
a symmetric monotone equilibrium to a uniform price sealed bid auction. We prove that 
equilibrium bidding strategies converge to truthful revelation as the number of bidders gets 
large. We also prove that the uniform price sealed bid auction and the English clock are 
not isomorphic in the two-unit demand environment. Either type of auction may gener-
ate higher efficiency and either may generate higher revenue. Finally, we report a set of 
experimental results which demonstrates that the revenue generating properties of the two 
auctions are different in two-unit demand environments. In the experimental environment, 
more revenue is generated by the uniform price sealed bid auction than the English clock, 
and more revenue is generated per market period if the market is run only once than if it 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
An auction is a "market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allo-
cation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants" (McAfee and McMillan 
(1987)). Auctions are used in every part of the world to transact trillions of dollars worth 
of objects every year. The omnipresence of auctions has certainly not gone unnoticed by 
economists who have generated a huge literature on the subject. The vast majority of the 
literature focuses on environments where a single seller has one or more indivisible object(s) 
to be sold to multiple bidders, each of whom wants to buy at most one of the objects. 
In most markets however, it is common for buyers to wish to buy more than one unit 
of a commodity. U.S. treasury bills are an example; about 1.5 trillion dollars worth of 
U.S. treasury bills are sold per annum (Salwen (1992)). They have been sold by two types 
of sealed bid auction: discriminatory (currently in use, where buyers pay the amount of 
their bids), and uniform price (in which all buyers pay the same price.). In many of the 
world's stock markets, initial issues of common stock are sold through sealed bid auctions. 
The Burlington Northern Railroad holds an auction for leasing railroad cars using a type 
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of uniform price sealed bid auction. BNR is the buyer and the owners of railroad cars 
are the sellers who submit bids. The railroad leases all cars for an amount equal to the 
highest accepted bid. In Great Britain, the National Grid Co., jointly owned by the UK's 
12 privatized distributors, buys electric power using an auction. Generators bid per-unit 
prices for 30 minute periods the following day and National accepts the lowest bids. The 
price paid is equal to the highest accepted bid. 
Economists have also advocated auctions as a means of resource allocation and price 
determination. Both the uniform price sealed bid auction (Furbush(1991)) and the open 
ascending bid auction (Salwen(1992)) have been proposed as alternative methods for selling 
treasury bills. Other example~ of such proposals include those made by Grether, Isaac and 
Plott (1981) , and Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin (1982), who advanced the idea of using sealed 
bid auctions to sell airport landing slots. 
The properties of auctions in environments with multi-unit demands have not been as 
thoroughly investigated as those in the single-unit demand case. In this dissertation, using 
the methodologies of both game theory and experimental economics, we explore whether 
particular properties of the single-unit demand case generalize to the multi-unit demand 
case, and establish that they often do not. In the next two subsections, we provide a brief 
survey of relevant previous work . 
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1.1 Previous Theoretical Literature 
1.1.1 Equilibria 
In the first major paper on the subject of auctions, Vickrey (1961) introduces the second 
price sealed bid auction and its multi-unit generalization, the uniform price sealed bid 
auction. In his paper he assumes an independent private values environment, in which 
each demander draws a valuation, known only to her, from a distribution which is known 
to all demanders. A particularly good example of a market in which the independent 
private values model might be appropriate is a market for a government contract where each 
contractor knows his own cost for fulfilling the contract and has enough general knowledge 
to infer the distribution of the other contractors' costs. 
The rules of the uniform price sealed bid auction specify that all demanders simultane-
ously submit sealed bids for the object(s). If there are k objects to be sold, the k highest 
bids are accepted and the corresponding demanders receive units. Demanders then pay a 
per-unit price equal to the k+ 1st highest bid for each unit they receive. In the case of 
single-unit demands, that is, when there may be multiple units to be sold but demanders 
purchase at most one unit, this auction form is demand revealing. Each bidder has a dom-
inant strategy to submit a bid equal to the value she has drawn. Recall that a player's 
dominant strategy ma;ximizes his expected utility no matter what strategies other players 
follow. The dominant strategy property follows from the fact that the second price sealed 
bid auction is a Groves mechanism. See Green and Laffont (1977) for a characterization of 
mechanisms with dominant strategy equilibria. 
Forsythe and Isaac ( 1982) show that the second price auction is the only demand re-
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vealing direct mechanism in the single-unit demand environment. The outcome is efficient, 
that is, it yields the maximum possible total profits to all participants in the market of 
any feasible allocation, because the item is purchased by the demander who has the highest 
valuation. 
To see the dominant strategy property, consider a bidder named i, who has some val-
uation v; for receiving the one object to be sold. Bidder i is a member of a group of n+1 
bidders, each of whom draws a valuation from a distribution G, which has strictly positive 
density on an interval [0, v]. Let Gn( x) be the probability that the highest valuation drawn 
by any of the other demanders is less than or equal to x and let 9n(x) = dGn(x). Let Fn(x) 
be the probability that the highest bid made by one of bidder i's competitors is less than 
or equal to x and let fn(x) = dFn(x). Assume fn(x) > 0 on the interval [O,v]. Bidder i 
chooses a bid b; to maximize his expected payoff: 
rb; 
E1r = Jo (v;- x)fn(x)dx. (1.1) 
The first order necessary condition for a maximum to (1.1) is: 
(vi- b;)fn(b;) = 0. (1.2) 
Since fn(x) has strictly positive density on [0, v], it follows that b; = v;. To see that bi = v; 
is a maximum, note from (1.2) that dd~; > 0 forb; < v; and < 0 for b; > v; . 
Vickrey also provides a discussion of English auctions within the independent private 
values model. An English auction is a progressive ascending bid auction. There are many 
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variants of English auctions which are strategically equivalent in the independent private 
values model. The auction form considered in this dissertation is the variant commonly 
known as the Japanese auction or English clock, used in, among other places, the produce 
markets of Tokyo and Osaka. This type of auction is modeled by Milgram and Weber (1982). 
The price is raised continuously and as it climbs bidders indicate whether they are still 
taking part in the bidding or quitting. In the single-unit demand case, they communicate 
whether or not they wish to purchase a unit at the current price. After a buyer drops out he 
may not resume bidding. As soon as exactly k bidders remain active the auction ends, and 
the remaining bidders receive units at the current price (the price at which the last bidder 
dropped out). Each bidder has a dominant strategy to stay in the bidding until the price 
reaches his valuation and then immediately quit bidding. In the unique dominant strategy 
equilibrium, the bidders with the k highest valuations receive the objects, resulting in an 
efficient final allocation. 
The uniform price sealed bid auction and the English clock generate the same final allo-
cations and final prices in their respective unique dominant strategy equilibria. Therefore, 
the two auctions are said to be isomorphic. The dominant strategy equilibria specify that 
each bidder truthfully reveal his valuation. Since the equilibrium strategies are the same 
for each player, the equilibria are said to be symmetric. 
Another auction mentioned in Vickrey's paper is the first price sealed bid auction. This 
type of auction is commonly used for government procurement contracts and its multi-unit 
generalization, the discriminatory sealed bid auction, is used in the treasury bill auction. 
There is no dominant strategy equilibrium in this type of auction, because a bidder's best 
response depends on the strategies the other players are using. However, maintaining the 
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same assumptions on Fn, Gn and v; in our discussion of the second price auction, we can 
find a symmetric, strictly monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium to this game. Recall that Nash 
equilibrium is a set of strategies (of all players) from which no player has an incentive to 
deviate. The set of dominant strategy equilibria to a game are thus a subset of the Nash 
equilibria. A Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium to a game with a particular 
informational environment, in which players know the distribution of all players' types 
but the actual realization only of their own type. Suppose all bidders follow some common 
strictly monotone bidding rule B( v ). The expected profits to bidder i can then be expressed 
as: 
. a-1 (b;) 
E1r'(b;) = fo (v;- b;)gn(x)dx. (1.3) 
The first order necessary condition to this problem is: 
(1.4) 
Using the symmetry and strict monotonicity of the bidding function, it can be shown that 
if B(v) solves equation (1.4) and E1ri(O) = 0 for all i, B(v;) must satisfy: 
(1.5) 
Because of the dominant strategy property and the efficient allocations generated by the 
uniform price sealed bid auction and the English clock in the single unit demand environ-
ment, it is natural to consider generalizations of the two auction types for the multi-unit 
demand environment. There has already been some interesting work on equilibrium mod-
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els of auctions in multi-unit demand frameworks. Wilson (1979) considers the case when 
the item to be sold is divisible and demanders have continuous downward sloping demand 
functions for fractions (shares) of the good. He solves for a market clearing price in an 
environment with common values when first or second price auctions are employed. In 
these auctions, bidders report a continuous demand function as their message. He finds the 
price is positive as is each bidder 's resulting share. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1979) 
give an example of a multi-object auction with non-additivity of preferences. This means 
that bidders' utilities for objects depend on what other objects they receive. They find 
that conducting multiple simultaneous sales may in general be quite inefficient. Although 
the example is for the uniform price sealed bid auction, the authors credibly claim that the 
inefficiency extends to other types of auctions. Palfrey (1980) models the simultaneous but 
separate sale of heterogeneous objects by first price sealed bid auction when bidders face a 
constraint on exposure. He finds that symmetric Nash equilibria exist if and only if there 
are two or less buyers and two or less objects. 
If a demander wishes to and is permitted to purchase more than one unit, the demand 
revealing property no longer necessarily holds for either the uniform price sealed bid auction 
or the English clock. Demanders may have positive incentive to underreveal their demand 
functions (see Forsythe and Isaac ( 1982) for an example) in order to lower the prices they 
pay. Therefore, the uniform price and English auctions do not necessarily yield efficient 
outcomes. 
Demand revealing mechanisms for multi-unit demand environments have been discov-
ered. Weber (1983) proposes an auction that yields a dominant strategy to bid truthfully 
on the k most highly valued units to each demander in a market where there are k identical 
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units to be sold. Each bidder simultaneously submits k sealed bids, the highest k bids 
secure items, and a bidder who receives 1 items is charged the sum of the 1 highest rejected 
bids made by other bidders. This auction is not uniform price as demanders pay different 
per-unit prices. 
In many of the markets where multi-unit auctions are employed, the units are not 
identical. Examples include the markets for art, real estate, and repossessed motor vehicles. 
Leonard (1983) generalizes the second price sealed bid auction for an environment where 
each buyer may purchase at most one of a heterogeneous set of units. Demange, Gale and 
Satomayer (1986) generalize the English clock for this type of environment. Both of these 
generalizations are demand revealing mechanisms. 
Vickrey suggests an auction form which yields a dominant strategy of truthful revelation 
in an environment where bidders may purchase more than one unit from a set of (possibly 
heterogeneous) objects . Each bidder submits a bid for every subset of the objects. The 
set of objects is distributed among the bidders according to the partition of the set which 
draws the maximum total bid amount (summing over the high bids on the elements of the 
partition). Each bidder is charged the difference between the maximum total which could 
have occurred had his bids not been submitted, and the sum of the high bids placed on 
the subsets other than the one he receives in the actual maximizing partition. A dominant 
strategy for each bidder is to bid the amount of his valuations. He also introduces an auction 
form which is demand revealing in an environment in which buyers have multi-unit demands 
and multiple identical objects to be sold are supplied elastically. It requires payments to 
the seller to exceed payments by the buyers, requiring a third party (perhaps a planner) to 
incur a deficit. All of these demand revealing auctions are variations of Groves mechanisms. 
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In chapter two we extend the independent private values model to allow demanders 
to have positive valuations for obtaining up to two units from a fixed supply of identical 
units. We model the simplest and most obvious generalization of the uniform price sealed 
bid auction for the two-unit demand environment and provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a bidding rule to be a symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium. In any 
symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium, each demander bids an amount equal to her 
valuation for her more highly valued unit and bids less than her valuation for her lower-
valued unit. We also prove that as the number of bidders approaches infinity, the amount 
of underrevelation on the lower-valued unit approaches zero. 
1.1.2 Revenue 
Vickrey notes that the three aforementioned auctions generate the same expected revenue 
(in equilibrium) in the risk neutral independent private values environment. The expected 
revenue is equal to the expected value of the second highest valuation. This observation is 
generalizable into an important result known as the revenue equivalence theorem. 
Revenue Equivalence Theorem: (Myerson (1981)) Every auction that allocates the 
goods efficiently and offers zero profit to a. zero valuation bidder has the same expected 
profit for every bidder valuation and the same expected revenue for the seller . 
An interesting and simple proof can be found in Milgram (1989). Let P equal the 
probability that the bidder wins the item, E denote the expected payment of the winner 
and X equal the winner's valuation. The bidder's utility is then: 
U(P,E,X) = P(X- E) . (1.6) 
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Let (P*(X), E*(X)) be the optimal choice for the bidder. Denote the corresponding profits 
as U*(P*(X), E*(X); X). It can be shown, invoking the envelope theorem, that the first 
order condition to the bidder's problem is: 
u•' (X) = U x(P*(X), E*(X); X)= P*(X). (1.7) 
Since U*(O) = 0: 
X 
U*(X) =fa P*(s)ds. (1.8) 
For any auction in which the allocation is always efficient, P*(X) equals the probability 
that all other bidders' valuations are less than X. Since the utility achieved by the bidder 
is independent of the method of sale, the rents taken by the seller must also be indepen-
dent of the method of sale. Thus the expected revenue must be the same in any auction 
mechanism which always generates an efficient allocation in equilibrium. The observation 
that a description of an auction could be reduced to a mapping P(X) which specified the 
probability of a bidder's getting the item as a function of his valuation allowed Myerson 
(1981) to discover the optimal auction , that is, the type of auction which generates the 
most revenue to the seller. In the optimal mechanism, there is a reserve price greater than 
or equal to the sellers valuation and the item goes to the bidder with the highest valuation. 
Revenue equivalence strongly depends on the assumption , which we keep in chapter two, 
that demanders are risk neutral. Risk aversion of the bidders results in the first price sealed 
bid auction yielding higher average revenue (Weber (1983)). The second price sealed bid 
auction and the English clock ha.ve dominant strategy equilibria., which a.re not affected by 
the level of risk aversion of the bidders. 
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The informational structure of the market environment can affect the equilibria and 
therefore the expected revenue of the auction games. The original independent private 
values model has been extended by Milgram and Weber (1982), who develop a general model 
(called the general symmetric model) of which the independent private values environment 
is a special case. Their model (they keep the assumption of risk neutrality) allows for private 
valuations as well as other variables which affect the value of the object to demanders (the 
variables are allowed to be affiliated which makes the bidders' value estimates statistically 
dependent). They prove that in the general symmetric model, the English clock generates 
higher expected revenue than the second price auction, which in turn yields greater expected 
revenue than the first price auction. An explanation for the higher revenue generated by 
the English clock offered by Milgram and Weber is that the English clock allows bidders 
who are uncertain about their valuations to acquire useful information from the behavior 
of other bidders. They also show that the English auction yields more revenue than eitber 
type of sealed bid auction if the seller releases any private information which she has about 
the value of the object. 
In chapter three we show that the uniform price sealed bid auction and the English clock 
are not isomorphic in the two-unit demand environment. Two examples are provided to 
illustrate that the auctions can generate different allocations in equilibrium. Either auction 
may, ex-ante, allocate the commodity more efficiently and either auction may generate 
higher revenue, invalidating some generalizations of the revenue equivalence theorem to the 
multi-unit demand case. 
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1.2 Previous Experimental Work 
Much of the experimental work done to date involving auctions of a fixed supply of identical 
units has been motivated by the theoretical results. We restrict our attention here to the 
experimental studies of auctions in independent private values environments. In general, 
in the case of single-unit demands, the predictions of the dominant strategy equilibria of 
the uniform price sealed bid and English auctions are supported. Coppinger, Smith and 
Titus (1980) find that observed prices in English and second price auctions are not different 
from those in the dominant strategy equilibrium and that the two auctions generate highly 
efficient final allocations. They also observe that the proportion of bidders following their 
dominant strategies increases as the auction is repeated. Cox, Roberson and Smith ( 1982) 
fail to reject the hypothesis that observed prices in the second price auction are equal to 
those occurring in the dominant strategy equilibrium and observe very efficient allocations. 
Burns (1985) finds that sequentia.l English auctions converge to the competitive outcome 
whatever the size of the market. McCabe, Rassenti and Smith ( 1991) consider the behavior 
of many types of multi-unit auctions in environments with single-unit demands. The English 
clock and the uniform price sealed bid auction produce slightly different outcomes. There 
is lower variance in prices and more efficient allocation under the English clock. McCabe 
et al. also find a very strong tendency for demanders to use their dominant strategy when 
playing the English clock. 
Thus when there is a unique symmetric dominant strategy equilibrium to an auction, it 
seems to be observed experimentally. However, when there exists a symmetric Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium but no dominant strategy equilibria to an auction game, the risk neutral Bayes-
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 13 
Nash equilibrium performs poorly in explaining the data from corresponding experiments. 
In first price auctions, observed bids are higher than those occuring in the symmetric Hayes-
Nash equilibrium under risk-neutrality. 
Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) find that a variation of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium 
concept, which allows demanders to exhibit varying degrees of risk aversion, better explains 
their experimental data for first price auctions. Cox, Smith and Walker (1985) reject the 
multiple-unit (but single-unit demand) generalization of the first price sealed bid symmetric 
Nash (risk neutral) equilibrium bidding model. They find some support for an alternative 
model, called the constant relative risk aversion model. 
Some experimental work has been concerned with the relative revenue generating prop-
erties of different auctions. Coppinger et al. find that the revenue in the second price 
auction is somewhat below that produced by the English auction. They also find (as do 
Cox et al. (1982)) that the first price sealed bid auction generates more revenue than the 
second price sealed bid and the English auction. Smith (1967) compares revenue generated 
by uniform price and discriminatory sealed bid auctions and concludes that the difference 
in revenue depends on the amount of excess demand. Miller and Plott (1985) find that the 
discriminatory auction generates more revenue than the uniform price auction when market 
demand is inelastic near the competitive equilibrium price and quantity while the uniform 
price auction takes in more revenue when market demand is relatively elastic. Cox, Smith 
and Walker ( 1985) observe that revenue from sealed bid auctions declines as the level of 
experience of the subjects increases but do not find strong evidence that the discriminatory 
auction generates either higher or lower revenue than the uniform price auction. Olson and 
Porter (1992) find that in a market with multiple heterogeneous goods to be sold but in 
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which demanders could only each buy one unit, that a generalization of the English clock 
generated higher more revenue than a generalization of the second price sealed bid auction. 
There are also previous results concerning allocative efficiency of various auctions. Cop-
pinger, Smith, and Titus observe that the final allocations of the English auction are more 
efficient than those of the second price sealed bid auction which are, in turn, more efficient 
than those of the first price sealed bid auction. Cox, Roberson, and Smith observe that 
the second price sealed bid auction generates more efficient allocations than the first price 
sealed bid auction. Olson and Porter find that the English clock leads to higher efficiencies 
than the second price sealed bid auction. 
In chapter three we report the results from a line of experimentation designed to consider 
relative revenues and allocative efficiencies of the uniform price auction and the English clock 
in the two-unit demand case. \Ve also compare the data from a single-unit demand condition 
to data from a two-unit demand condition. For the parameters in the two-unit demand 
condition of our experiment, we find that the uniform price auction generates significantly 
more revenue than the English clock. Also, significantly greater revenue is generated per 
market period (for both types of market organization) when the markets are conducted 
only once than when they are repeated and more revenue is generated by the English clock 
in the single-unit demand environment than in the two-unit demand environment. In all 
conditions the final allocations are highly efficient. 
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1.3 This Dissertation 
15 
In this dissertation we present a collection of theoretical and experimental results. The focus 
is on the generalization of the properties of auctions in single-unit demand environments to 
environments with two-unit demands. The main contributions of the dissertation are the 
following: 
• Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a set of bidding strategies to be a 
symmetric monotone equilibrium to the uniform price auction when demanders wish to 
purchase two units from a set of identical units. 
• A proof of convergence of bidding strategies to truthful revelation as the number of bidders 
gets large is provided. 
• The uniform price sealed bid auction and the English clock are proven not to be isomorphic 
in the two-unit demand environment. Either type of auction may achieve higher expected 
efficiency and either may result in higher expected revenue. Both of these results contrast 
sharply with the results in single-unit demand environments. 
• A set of experimental results is reported. The results indicate that the revenue generating 
properties of the two auctions are different in two-unit demand environments although no 
significant difference is detected in their allocative efficiency. More revenue is generated 
by the uniform price sealed bid auction than by the English clock. Also, more revenue 
is generated per market period if the market is run once than if it is repeated for several 
periods. 
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Chapter 2 
The Uniform Price Sealed Bid 
Auction 
In this chapter we generalize the independent private values framework to allow demanders 
to draw positive valuations for obtaining up to two units from a set of identical units of a 
commodity. We then consider the theoretical properties of a simple generalization of the 
uniform price auction within the two-unit demand independent private values environment. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for a bidding function to be a symmetric monotone 
Bayes-Nash equilibrium are derived, and an example is provided. It is also shown that 
as the number of bidders gets large, the only possible symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium is truthful bidding. 
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2.1 The Model 
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Let there be k (> 1) identical units to be sold and n+l (> 1) demanders indexed by 
i = 1, ... , n + 1. Each demander draws two valuations independently from a fixed and 
common distribution 1'( v ), where 1'( v) has strictly positive density on [O,v] C R+ and 
1'( v) E C 2 • Order the two values from higher to lower and index them 1 and 2 respectively; 
vf ~ v~ ~ 0 are the valuations of demander i. Define G( vf, vD = Prob( Vt ~ vf, v2 ~ v~), 
where v1 and v2 are a pair of values independently drawn from 1'(v). Let g(v1,v2) denote 
the probability density function of G. Since g is a joint density of order statistics drawn 
from a distribution with positive density on [0, v], g(v1 , v2) > 0 for all Vt. v2 such that 
0 ~ v2 ~ v1 ~ v. All demanders are risk neutral. Valuations are private information but')', 
n, and k are common knowledge. 
2.2 The Game 
All demanders submit two nonnegative bids . The highest k bids are accepted and the 
corresponding demanders pay a per-unit price equal to the k + 1st highest bid. A tie for 
kth highest bid is broken by randomly allocating a unit to one of the tied demanders. A 
bid which is equal to zero is never accepted. 
When buyers are willing to pay for more than one unit, the uniform price sealed bid 
auction does not have the incentive properties it has in environments with single-unit de-
mands. The following example may clarify this idea. Suppose for simplicity (and only 
for the example) that there is complete information, so that each buyer knows all of the 
valuations of the others . 
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Table 2.1: Buyers' Valuations in Example 1 
buyer 1 buyer 2 
Higher Valuation 5 3 
Lower Valuation 4 0 
Example 1: The number of buyers (n+1) = 2, and the number of units to be sold (k) 
= 2. Buyers' valuations are given in table 2.1: 
Consider buyer 1' s decision on what to bid. He supposes that buyer 2 is going to bid 
3 on his highest unit and 0 on his second unit (later we will show this strategy to be the 
best response of bidder 2) . If buyer 1 bids the amount of his valuations, that is 5 on his 
high unit and 4 on his second, he wins both units. The per-unit price paid is equal to the 
highest rejected bid, which is 3. Then his profits are (5-3)+ (4- 3) = 3. Buyer 2's profits 
are zero. If instead, buyer 1 bids 5 on his high unit and then 0 on his second unit while 
buyer 2 bids 3 on his high unit and 0 on his second, each bidder receives one unit, the price 
is zero, and the profits are 5 and 3 to buyers 1 and 2 respectively. By underbidding on his 
second unit, buyer 1 wa.s made better off. For buyer 1, bidding his valuation for that unit 
was not his best response. 
2.3 Symmetric Equilibria 
2.3.1 Necessary Conditions 
Since the environment described in section 2.1 specifies symmetrically informed bidders 
whose valuations are drawn from a common distribution, it is natural to consider equilib-
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ria which consist of symmetric bidding strategies. Therefore, we restrict our attention to 
symmetric equilibria. In theorem 1 we derive a necessary condition for a bidding strategy 
to be a symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Several definitions are required for 
the statement and proof of the theorem. 
two valuations into two bids. 
Definition 2 A bidding function , B( v1 , v2) is type M if: 
1} B(O,O} = (0,0} , 
2} B is continuous in v1 and v2, 
5} ~82 exists and is > 0 if B j > 0 and ?j!.;. exists and is 2: 0; z i= j if Bj > 0. 
~ v~ 
Definition 2 describes a general notion of monotonicity. It allows bidding strategies 
which specify that Bj( v1 , v2) = 0 for all v1 ~ v1 and v2 ~ v2 for any v1 E [0, v] and any 
v2 E [0, v]. It includes , a.s a special case, bidding functions which are strictly increasing in 
v1 and v2 (where 0 = v2 = vi). The concept of separability is described in definition 3. 
Definition 3 A bidding function is separable if B(v1 ,v2) = (B1 (vl),B2(v2)). That ts, 
a demander's bid for his higher (lower) valued unit is independent of his lower {higher) 
valuation. 
Definition 4 
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(2.1) 
The function H(.) is the probability that in a sample of size n drawn from g( v1 , v2 ), exactly l 
observations in the sample have the property that ( Vt ::; Zt, v2 ::; z2), exactly m observations 
have the property that ( Vt > Zt, V2 ::; Z2) and exactly n - m - £ have the property that 
Definition 5 
(2.2) 
The function T(.) is important to the statement and the proofs of theorems 1-3. It is useful 
in describing the amount by which bidders underbid on their lower valued unit in a Type 
M equilibrium. 
Definition 6 (F;i (x)IB) = Prob(at least v bids made by bidders other than i are less than 
or equal to x if all bidders except for bidde1· i use B). 
In other words, (F;i(x)IB) is the cumulative distribution function of the vth order statistic 
of bids made by n randomly chosen demanders using strategy B. 
Theorem 1 A bidding function (3 ( Vt, v2) = (f3t ( Vt, v2), fJ2( Vt, v2)) is a symmetric type M 
undominated Boyes-Nash equilibrium only if: 
(2.3) 





and 7J2 solves the differential equation: 
(2.6) 
with the initial conditions: 
v; = 0; if n > k- 1 
7J2(0) = 0; ifn = k -1. (2.7) 
Theorem 1 is proven using lemmas 1-7, which are stated and proven in this subsection. 
An additional lemma ( 10) , required for technical purposes, is stated and proven in appendix 
A. 
nated type M Bayes-Nash equilibr-ium only if: 
(2.8) 
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Proof: Suppose all n+1 bidders are using the same equilibrium bidding function 
B* ( VJ. v2 ). For notational ease, let Fv-i• ( x) = Fv-i ( x) I B*. Since B* is symmetric, 1 is 
fixed and common, and valuations are drawn independently, F;i*(x) = F;(x);Vi. Since B* 
is an equilibrium, all bidders are maximizing expected profit. To derive the expected profit 
to bidder i, as a function of the amount he bids, we must divide all possible outcomes of 
the auction into four cases. 
Case 1: The purchase price is lower than i's highest bid but higher than his second highest, 
in which case i receives one unit. His profits are the value for his highest unit, vi, minus the 
price he pays, which is the kth highest or 2n-k+1st lowest of the other players' bids, since 
there are k others besides i. The profits in case 1 times the probability of the occurrence of 
case 1 is equal to: 
(2.9) 
where Mv is the vth lowest order statistic of bids made by bidders other than bidder i and 
b~ is the jth highest bid made by bidder i. 
Case 2: The price is lower than either of i's bids, implying that i's two bids are among the 
k highest. Profits are vi + v~ minus two times the price he pays. This price is equal to the 
2n-k+2nd lowest of the other players' bids. The profits in case 2 times the probability of 
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case 2 equals: 
b' fa 2 (v~ + v~- 2M2n-k+2)fin-k+2(M2n-k+2)dM2n-k+2· (2.10) 
Case 3: Bidder i 's higher bid is accepted and his lower bid sets the price. The higher bid is 
among the k highest and the lower bid is the k+1st highest , implying that the lower bid is 
between the 2n-k+1st lowest and the 2n-k+2nd lowest of the other demanders bids. Profits 
are equal to v{ minus i 's lower bid . The profits in case 3 times the probability of case 3 is 
given by: 
(2.11) 
Case 4: The price is higher than either of i's bids . Neither of his bids are accepted, he 
receives no units , and his profits are 0. 
By combining the last three equations, we see that the objective function for bidder i is 
given by: 
b' +fa 2 ( v~ + v~ - 211hn-i.·+2)!2n-k+2(M2n-k+2)dM2n-k+2 
+(v~- b~)(Fin-k+l(b~)- Fin-k+2(b~)). (2.12) 
In equilibrium, bidder i's two bids , bl and b~ , are chosen to maximize the objective function 
subject to: 
(2.13) 
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The first order necessary (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions are given by: 
8E7ri ( i hi )f* (hi) hi B;;- = VI - I 2n-k+I I = 0; I > 0, 
I 
::; 0; hl = 0, (2.14) 
and: 
8E1ri ( ; hi)!* (hi) (F.* (hi) F.* (hi)) hi a;;- = v2 - 2 2n-k+2 2 - 2n-k+I 2 - 2n-k+2 2 = 0; 2 > 0, 
2 
::; 0; h~ = 0. (2.15) 
If f2n-k+I (hi) > 0, then B* is separable and Bj( vi)= VI for VI ;::: 0. If f2n-k+I (hi) = 0, then 
there can be more than one solution but any strategy is weakly dominated by Bj( vi) = vi. 
Any strategy which involves underbidding results in profits identical to those under truthful 
revelation if the final price is less than hi, but lower profits than those under truthful 
revelation if the final price is less than vf but greater than hi. Any strategy which involves 
overbidding results in profits to bidder i that are identical to those under truthful revelation 
if the final price is less than v~ but are lower than those under truthful revelation if the 
final price is above vi but less than hi. D 
We have shown that in equilibrium, each bidder's higher bid equals his higher valuation. 
We derive the lower bid in lemmas 2-7. 
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Lemma 2 /3 is a Type M undominated symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium only if {32 ( v2 ) = 
(2.16) 
Proof: The derivation of B2( v2) requires the derivation of the expression (F2n-k+l (b~)-
F2n-k+2 (b~))/ f2n-k+2(b~) in equation (2.15). By lemma 10, which is in appendix A, 
f2n-k+2 (b~) > 0. Since B* is being used by all players and Bi( vl) = v1: 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
where the function ll2(x) :[0, B2(v)J--...[v2,"v], and ll2(x) B2h(x ). Now consider the 
probability that a randomly drawn bidder, named y '1- t, submits 2 bids that are less 
than or equal to b~. The probability that two of y's bids are less than b~ is the probability 
of the following event: 
(2.19) 
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Similarly, exactly one of y's bids is less than or equal to b~ when either of the two 




The last expression equals 0 because it requires that (vi:::; b~,v~ ~ V2(b~)), an event 
that occurs with probability zero. 
Since the expression (F2n-k+l (b~)- F2n-k+2 (b~))/ f2n-k+2 (b~) ~ 0 (because the numer-
a tor is a probability and the denominator is a density), it must be the case that V2( b~) ~ b~; 
but by assumption vi ~ v~. The probability that demander y makes 0 bids less than or 
equal to b~ is given by: 
(2.22) 
Suppose now that each of the n bidders other than bidder i draws one pair of valuations 
from G( v1 , v2 ). Suppose exactly £ of the buyers make two bids less than or equal to b~, 
exactly m buyers make one, and exactly (n-m-£) bidders make zero bids less than or equal 
to b~. The probability of this event is given by: 
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Prob( exactly .e observations of Bi( v}i) ~ b~, exactly m + .e observations of Bi( v;zi) ~ b~) 
The previous expression equals H(b~, V2(b~), G, n, m, f) where H is as defined in equation 








The last three equations imply that: 
(2.27) 
Since all bidders are using the same strategy, b~ must equal B2(v;) . Therefore: 
T(biTf. (bi)(oV2)- 1 G k)-T(B*(i) i8Bi(v2)G k) 2• I 2 2 ' ob2 ' 'n, - 2 V2 'V2, QV2 ' 'n, • (2.28) 
Using equations (2.15),(2.27) and (2 .28), we see that equation (2.6) and the second part of 
equation (2.4) must hold. D 
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In lemmas 3 and 4 we solve for v2 . If any demander draws a lower valuation less than 
equal to v2, he submits a lower bid equal to zero. We show that v2 is equal to v2, where v2 
satisfies equation (2.5). 
Lemma 3 fh( v2) = 0; where v2 satisfies: 
(2.29) 
Proof: The first order conditions imply that for b~ = 0: 
(2.30) 
Equation (2.30) holds with equality if F2(0) = T(O, V2(0), ( 8 ~~~o) )-1, G, n, k), which implies 
2 
that V2 (0) = v2 and shows that equation (2.5) must hold. 0 
Proof: Consider v~ < v2. 
(2.31) 
By equation (2.15), B2(v~) = 0. It is shown that the first part of equation (2.4) must hold 
in equilibrium. 0 
In lemmas 5-7 we derive initial conditions for the differential equation in (2.6). The 
initial conditions depend on the difference between the number of bidders and the number 
of units to be sold. 
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Lemma 5 v2 = 0; if n > k - 1. 
Proof: Consider v2 = T(O, v2, 88jv~v:i), G, n, k). By lemma 10, which is stated and proven 
in Appendix A, the denominator of the last expression, which is equal to f2n-k+ 2 (0), is 
strictly greater that 0. If the numerator is equal to zero, it would imply that v2 = 0. The 
numerator is: 
I 
L H(O , Vz(O) , G, n, m ,f) = L f' '( :· _f)' 
l,m;U+m=2n -k+1 l,m;U+m=2n-k+1 '
1n. n m ' 
(2.32) 
The last expression equals 0 unless e = 0. Suppose f equals 0. Then the expression equals: 
Since m ;::: 0, the last expression equals 0 if 2n- k + 1 > n which occurs if n + 1 > k, that 
is, if the total number of bidders is greater than the number of units . Therefore, v2 = 0 
when n > k - 1. D 
Lemma 6 /32 (v) = v; if n < k- 1. 
Proof: Consider T(B2(v), v, 8~~;v), G, n, k). The denominator ofT is positive by lemma. 
10. If the numerator is equal to zero we know that B2(v) = v. If v~ = v, the numerator of 
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T equals: 
L H(B2(v),v,G,n,m,e)= L 
1 1 
n! 
em (n- m- l)' l,m ;2l+m=2n-k+I l,m;2l+m=2n-k+I · · · 
(2.34) 
The previous equation equals 0 unless n = m + e. It also equals 0 unless 2£ + m = 2n- k + 1. 
It can be easily shown that n = m + e and 2£ + m = 2n - k + 1 cannot be satisfied 
simultaneously if n < k - 1. 
(2£ + m = 2n- k + 1) {::} (2£- n- e = 2n- k + 1) {::} (£ = n- k + 1). (2.35) 
Noting that l ~ 0, we see that equation (2 .35) is false if n < k-1. We have now shown that 
if n + 1 < k, T(B2(v), v , 8~~;v), G, n, k) = 0 and have obtained the initial condition that 
B2(v) = v if n + 1 < k. The second part of equation (2.7) must hold. D 
Lemma 7 -;B2 (0) = 0; if n = k- 1. 
Proof: Define B;(o) to be: 
-·( -=- ) aB;(o) B 2 0)=0-T(O,B2(0, 0 ,G,n,k). V2 
(2.36) 
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The numerator ofT equals: 
"" -=- "" n! L..t H(B2 (0),0,G,n,m,f)= L..t f' '( _ _ )' 
l,m;2l+m=2n-k+1 l,m;2l+m=2n-k+1 .n1. n m f . 
(2.37) 
The last expression equals zero unless f = 0 and m = 0. However, if f = m = 0, the 
expression equals zero unless 2n-k+ 1 equals zero. If 2n - k + 1 = 0, then n ::p k - 1 if n > 0. 
Therefore, for n = k - 1, T(O, "B;(O), 8~~;o), G, n, k) = 0, which implies that n;(o) = 0 for 
n = k - 1, showing that the third part of equation (2 . 7) must hold. 
Proof of Theorem 1 The proof follows directly from lemmas 1-7. It has now been 
shown that B*( v11 v2) is a type M undominated symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium, only if 
it equals {3. D 
2.3.2 Sufficient Conditions 
In theorem 1 we provided necessary conditions for a bidding function to be a symmetric 
undominated Type M Bayes-Nash equilibrium. In theorem 2 sufficient conditions are given 
for f3 to be an equilibrium. There are two conditions: A and B. Condition A insures that the 
appropriate second order conditions are satisfied; if all other demanders use {3, the payoff 
function of bidder i is concave in bidder i 's strategy. Condition B insures that f3 is type M. 
Theorem 2 Suppose that: 




1 &T &T &2 /h 
- &v2 - &(32 &v~ 
1 &T > 0. + &(32 
(2.39) 
symmetric undominated Type M Bayes-Nash equilibrium if it satisfies (2.3} - (2. 7) 
The theorem is proven using several lemmas. In lemma 8 we prove that f3 is Type M. 
In lemma 9 we prove that f3 is an equilibrium. Lemmas 10 and 11, required for technical 
reasons, are proven in appendix A. 
Lemma 8 If condition B holds, f3 is Type Nf. 
Proof: Clearly /3(0,0) = (0,0) and /3 is continuous in v1 and v2 . v1 (v2 ) = 0, v2 (vt) = v:i 
T(/32 , v2 , ~, G, n, k ). The partial derivative of /32 with respect to v2 satisfies: 
(2.40) 
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Rearranging terms in the last equation yields: 
1 8T 8T ~ - 8v2 - 8fh 8v
2 
1 + 8T Wf2 
(2.41) 
whlch is greater than zero by assumption B. Finally, since f3 is separable: 
(2.42) 
We have now shown that f3 is type M. 0 
Lemma 9 If conditions A and B hold, f3 is a undominated Type M symmetric Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium. 
Suppose all bidders except for bidder i are using the bidding function /3( v1 , v2 ). The 
objective function for bidder i is given by: 
b; 
+ fo 2 ( v; + v~- 2Mzn-k+z)hn-k+z(Mzn-k+z)dMzn-k+2 
+(v;- b~)(Fzn-k+1(b~)- Fzn-k+Z(b~)). (2.43) 
where F~.~(x) F;i J/3. Bidder chooses bi and b~, to maximize the objective function 
subject to: 
(2.44) 
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By lemma 11 (see Appendix A), the objective function is twice differentiable. The first 
order necessary conditions are given by: 
8E1r; · · · · 
7JiT = (v~- bDhn-k+t(b;) = O;b~ > 0, 
1 
$ 0; bi = 0, (2.45) 
and: 
$ 0; b~ = 0. (2.46) 





The second order conditions are then: 
(2.50) 
It follows from (2.45) that if hn-k+l ( b~) > 0, then b1 = Vt for Vt ~ 0. If hn-k+l ( b~) = 0, 
then there can be more than one solution to (2.4.5) but any strategy is weakly dominated 
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by bt = Vt. Therefore b{ = f3t (vi) = vi. Since f3 being used by all players besides i and f3 
is type M, 
(2.51) 
And since a,B§(v2 ) > 0 for v2 > v2*: . V2 
(2.52) 
As we did in the proof of theorem 1, we can derive the following equation: Prob( exactly f 
observations of f31 (v!i) s; b~, exactly m + f observations of f32 (v:;i) s; b~) 
The previous expression equals H(b~, W2(b~) , G, n , m,f) , and equations (2.54) and (2.55) 
follow: 
H(b~, W2(b~) , G, n, m,f), (2.54) 
e,m ;2f+m=2n - k+l 
(2.55) 
The last two equations imply that: 
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We can rewrite the first order condition in (2.46) for b~ > 0 as: 
One solution to the last equation is to set b~ = (32 ( v~): 
Recalling the fact that H1(x) = f32 1 (x), we see that: 
The first order conditions imply that for b~ = 0: 
0 ~ W2(0)- T(O, W2(0),(8T;~~O))_\G,n,k), 








The last inequality holds with equality when W2(0) = v2. Now consider some v2 < v2. 
(2.61) 
By the first order condition (2.46), b2( v2) = /32( v2) = 0. We have now shown that the best 
response to f3 must satisfy (2.3)-(2.6). 
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It remains to derive initial conditions for the differential equation in (2.59). Consider 
v* = T(O v* 8.62 (v2) G n k) = F2n-k±J (O)-F2n-kt2 (0). By lemma 10 f2n-k+2(0) > 0. If 
2 ' 2• 8v2 ' ' ' hn-k±2(0) 
F2n-k+1(0)- F2n-k+2(0) = 0 it would imply that v2 = 0. 
n! 
F2n-k+1(0)- Fzn-k+z(O) = L fl '( _ _ f)l 
l,m;U+m=2n-k+1 .m. n m . 
(2.62) 
The last expression equals 0 unless f = 0. If f equals 0, the expression in equation (2.62) 
equals: 
Since m 2: 0 the last expression equals 0 if n + 1 > k implying that v2 = 0 if n + 1 > k. 
Now consider T(j32(v), v, 
8~~;v) , G , n, k ). If the numerator is equal to zero, j32(v) = v. The 
numerator equals : 
n! L H(j32 (v) ,v,G, n , nt,C)= L f' '( _ -e)' 
l,m;2l+m=2n-k+1 e,m;U+m=2n-k+1 .m. n m . 
(2.64) 
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The previous equation equals 0 unless n = m + l. It is also 0 unless 2£ + m = 2n- k + 1. 
n = m + l and 2£ + m = 2n - k + 1 can not both be true if n < k - 1. Therefore, 
if n + 1 < k, T(f32(v), v, 8~:;v), G, n, k) = 0 and the initial condition that {32(v) = v if 
n + 1 < k follows. Now suppose n+1= k and consider P2 (0) where: 
(2.65) 
The numerator of T(/32 (0), 0, 
8~~~o), G, n, k) equals: 
' L H(P2 (0),0,G,n,m,e) = L l' '( :· -f)' 
e,m;2l+m=2n-k+l e,m;2l+m=2n-k+l .m. n m . 
(2.66) 
The last expression equals zero unless l = 0 and m = 0. However, if l = m = 0, the 
expression equals zero unless 2n-k+1 equals zero. If 2n- k + 1 = 0 then n :/= k- 1 if n > 0. 
Therefore, for n = k - 1, T = 0 which implies that tJ2 (0) = 0 when n = k - 1. 
We have now shown that {3( v1 , v2 ) is a solution to the first order conditions in (2.45) and 
(2.46). If the appropriate second order conditions hold, f3 is a best response. The second 
order conditions are: 
(2.67) 
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and 
(2.68) 
a;~'lr < 0 is satisfied if bi = VI and hn-k+I(b2) is greater than zero. If hn-k+I(b2) = 0, 
l 
then many solutions are possible but bi = VI dominates any solution that has bi =fi VI· 
a;~'lr < 0 is insured by condition A. To see this, consider: 
2 
Equation (2.69) implies that f~n-k+2 ( b~) 
(2.69) 
and it is now apparent from equations (2.38), (2 .69) and (2.70) that assumption A is satisfied 
if and only if 
82!;113 < 0 for all b2 such that 0 :=:; b2 :=:; v. Assumption A guarantees that the 
2 
function Etri is strictly concave in b~ when all demanders besides bidder i use the strategy 
{3. We have now shown that {3 is a best response to itself under assumptions A and B. 0 
There is underrevelation on the lower valued unit for the following reason: in the event 
that a demander's lower bid is the k+1st highest, he has some incentive to underbid on 
it in order to lower the price he pays for the unit he receives (the fact that the lower bid 
is the k+ 1st highest implies that the higher bid is among the k highest, and therefore the 
demander receives exactly one unit). There is no incentive to underbid on the higher valued 
unit, since in the event that the demander's higher bid is the k+ 1st highest, he wins no 
units, and his profits are zero. Overbidding is always a dominated strategy. 
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The two symmetric equilibrium bids are separable, indicating that the extent of under-
revelation on the lower unit depends only upon the rank of the unit, the distribution of 
valuations, the number of bidders and the number of units sold, and is independent of the 
bidder's higher valuation and his higher bid. The independence results from the fact that 
the price paid is independent of the amount of the higher bid, and therefore the gains from 
lowering the final price depend only upon how many bids are accepted in the event that 
the lower bid is the k+1st highest . 
It is important to realize that if a symmetric equilibrium to this game exists, it does 
not preclude the existence of asymmetric Nash equilibria. Consider a case where there are 
two units to be sold to two buyers, each of whom values two units. One buyer bids v for 
both of her units and the other bids 0 for both of her units . No single demander has any 
positive incentive to change her strategy. 
2.3.3 A Simple Example 
The following is an example of an undominated Type M symmetric equilibrium. 
Suppose 1( v) is uniform on the interval from 0 to 1, n + 1 = 2 and k = 3. We know that 
,81 ( vn = vf in an undominated symmetric equilibrium. The calculation of ,82 ( v~), which 
equals v~- T(.), proceeds in the following manner. First note that e!m!(n~m-e)! = 1. Using 
the fact that v1 ~ v2 , we can derive the following equation which gives the probability that 
a bidder makes exactly two bids less than or equal to b~: 
(2.71) 
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The probability that a randomly chosen bidder makes exactly one bid less than or equal to 
b~ equals: 
(2.72) 
and again using v1 ~ v2 , we can derive the probability that a randomly chosen bidder makes 
exactly zero bids that are less than or equal to b~. The probability is given by: 
(2.73) 
It can be easily verified that: 
(2.74) 
The numerator ofT equals the following expression (note 2n-k+l = 0): 
(2.75) 
(m,l;m+U=2n-k+l) 
Next, we derive the denominator ofT. F2n-k+2(b~) equals: 
(2.76) 
The derivative of this expression is: 
(2.77) 
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Since the equilibrium is symmetric, V2 ( b~) = v;. The solutions to the first order necessary 
conditions are given by: 
(2.78) 
(2.79) 
with the initial condition ,82(1) = 1 because n < k- 1. Solving for ll~(b~) we obtain: 
V'(b') - 1 - v2 
2 2 
- 2(v' b') 2 - 2 
(2.80) 
A solution can be found by setting b~ = ( v;)2 which implies that V2 (b~) = (b~)t and also 
that V~ = ~( v;)- 1 . We obtain: 
(2.81) 
It can be readily verified that the second order conditions are satisfied . 
2.4 Large Numbers of Bidders 
If a large number of bidders wants to buy a fixed supply of units, one might expect that each 
bidder has little incentive to underreveal his demand . As the number of bidders approaches 
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infinity, it seems reasonable to believe that, if demanders are playing symmetric equilibrium 
strategies, the amount of underrevelation would converge to zero, each bidder would submit 
two bids equal to his valuations, and the result would be an efficient final allocation at 
the competitive equilibrium prices. In theorem 1, we provided necessary conditions for a 
bidding function to be an undominated Type M symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The 
equilibrium must involve underbidding by an amount equal to T(.) on demanders' lower 
valued units. If it could be shown that as the number of bidders gets large, T converges 
to zero, then the equilibrium bidding strategies must converge to truthful revelation. The 
following theorem implies that in fact, as the number of bidders becomes large and the 
supply remains constant, the only possible symmetric undominated type M Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium is truthful bidding. 
Theorem 3 Let z1(n) : N -+ [O,v],z2(n) : N ---.. [O,v] and z3(n): N --+ R+. and let 
z1 (n)::;; z2(n) for all n. Then fork fixed, as n-+ oo, T(zt(n), z2(n), z3(n), G, k, n)--+ 0 
Proof: Recall that: 
(2.82) 
(2.83) 
'\'2n '\' n 1 T. 
L....q=2n-k+2 L....m,e:m+2 f=q f!m!(n_.:m-()! denom 
where: 
(2.84) 
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Let n increase to n+1 fork fixed. Then it must be the case that f also increases to f + 1 
since the summation in the last equation is over all combinations of m and f such that: 
m + 2f = 2n- k + 1. Therefore, n-+ oo => f-+ oo. Let a= n- f. a stays constant as n 
and f increase. Since the integrand in the next equation is less than or equal to one: 
= 1; Z1 = V. (2.85) 
Also: 
where 0 ~ A(.) < 1 and equals 0 if z1 = v. It follows that: 
lim Tnum(zl(n),z2(n), z3(n),G,n,k) = 0. 
n-oo 
(2.87) 





)" Jo Z3 n (2.88) 
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We know from equation (2.85) that: 
= 1; Z1 = V. (2.89) 
Let: 




-oo < X(n) < oo. The derivative exists and is finite because g(v1,v2) E C 1 on [O,vj2. 




lim (n- a)( g(z1(n), v2)dv2)(n-o-l) = lim (n- a)= oo. 
n--+oo 0 n-+oo 
(2.91) 
Let Z(n) = 81~~· -). -oo < Z(n) < oo. The derivative exists and is finite because g(v1, v2) E 
C 1 on [0, v] 2 . z1
3 
is > 0 because by assumption z3( n) > 0. The remaining term of Tdenom is: 
(2.92) 
the last equation, zl(n) < z2(n) while VI 2: v2 . Therefore, u;J(n) g(vl, z2)dv2) = 0 for a.ll n . 
..!.. is > 0 by assumption. Now, notice that: 
Z3 
(2.93) 
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Therefore: 
< 
< l:m,a;2(n-a)+m=2n-k+l ( (n a)!~i(a-m)! Tnum) 
Lm,a;2(n-a)+m=2n-k+2( (n a}!~ha m}!Tdenom) 
n! 
"""' (n a)!m!(a-m}! Tnum ) 
~ n! T. 
m,a;2(n-a)+m=2n-k+l (n-a+l)!(m-l)!(a-m)! denom 
lim T(.):::; """' (lim n- a+ 1 * lim Tnum ) 










Since m ~ 1 (because 2f.. + m = 2n - k + 1, k ~ 2 and e :::; n), the limit in the la.st expression 
is clearly 0 if A(n) > 0. 
Now reca.ll that in any type M equilibrium, !32 ( v2) :::; v2 and {!!;: > 0 for v 2 ~ vi. 
Also, in any type M equilibrium, A(n,/32(v2),v2,G) > 0 for v2 < v. Therefore we can let 
z1(n) = :B2(v2,n,.),z2(n) = v2, and z3(n) = ai3~~;·n). It must be the case that: 
(2.98) 
0 
2.4.1 Digression: A Note on Replication 
It might seem reasonable to compare the behavior of an economy with n+1 demanders and 
k units to be sold with that of an economy with 2(n+1) demanders and 2k units to be sold. 
One might conjecture that the expected revenue of the uniform price sealed bid auction in 
the latter economy would be twice the expected revenue in the former. It can be shown 
that the conjecture is false in the multi-unit demand case but it is easy to show that it is 
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also false even in the single-unit demand case. The following example clarifies the idea. 
Example 3: n + 1 = 2, k = 1, and demanders draw one valuation from G(v) which we 
assume for the example is uniform on [0,1). In the dominant strategy equilibrium, bi = vi. 
The expected revenue is equal to the expected value of the lower of 2 order statistics in a 
sample of 2 drawn from G. 
- ~ j+oo (n+1)! k-1 n+l-k 
Rev1-k - oo v(k- 1)!(n+ 1 -k)!G(v) (1-G(v)) g(v)dv 
(2.99) 
j +oo = - oo v(2 - 2v )dv. (2.100) 
Now suppose n + 1 = 4, and k = 2. The expected revenue from the auction is equal to the 
expected value of the second lowest order statistic from a sample of 4 drawn from G. The 
expected revenue equals: 
(2.101) 
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Chapter 3 
Uniform Price Auction vs. 
English Clock 
As we saw in chapter one, the uniform price sealed bid auction and the English clock 
are isomorphic in the independent private values environment when demands are single-
unit. The focus of this chapter is the difference in the bidding strategies, revenue and final 
allocations between the two types of auctions under multi-unit demands. As is illustrated 
in section 3.1, the type of auction which achieves higher expected efficiency and induces 
higher bids, leading to higher expected revenue, depends on the distribution of valuations 
of demanders. 
In sections 3.2-3.4 we describe the design of an experiment, which we use to consider some 
empirical properties of the two types of auctions . In section 3.5 we give some theoretical 
predictions of experimental outcomes. In section 3.6 we analyze the data in detail and 
describe the results. We compare the a.llocative efficiency and market revenue across three 
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different dimensions: 
1) whether the uniform price sealed bid auction or the English clock is employed, 
2) whether individual demands are single-unit or two-unit, 
3) whether the auction is run once or is repeated. 
We also test statistically the predictions of the dominant strategy equilibria of both 
types of auctions in the single-unit demand environment , the symmetric monotone Hayes-
Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction in the two-unit demand environment , as well 
as revenue equivalence of the two auctions . 
3.1 Theoretical Non-Equivalence 
The purpose of this section is to show that the uniform price sealed bid auction and the En-
glish dock do not necessarily generate identical expected revenues and allocative efficiencies 
in their respective symmetric equilibria. in multi-unit demand environments. 
Assume the following independent private values framework. Let there be m demanders 
indexed by i so that i=l , ... ,m. There are k identical units of a commodity to be sold. 
Each demander i draws w; valuations vi, ... , v~j i~1dependently from a distribution r;( v ). 
Demander i knows m,k, vL ... ,v~;,r 1 ( v ) , .. . , rm( v ) and w1 , • • • , wm. He does not know the 
actual valuations of the other buyers. 
Theorem 4 The English clock and the uniform price sealed bid auction may generate in-
efficient allocations in their respect ive symmetric equilibria. Either the English clock or 
the uniform price sealed bid auction may generate greater expected revenue or a/locative 
efficiency. 
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Proof: Consider examples 4 and 5. 
Example 4: m = 3, k = 2, w1 = 2, w2 = W3 = 1. 
0 v < 1, 
.01 1 ~ v < 8, (3.1) 
1 v ~ 8. 
An approximation of df2 ( v) is illustrated in figure 3.1. Let f 1 ( v) = 0 for v < 10 and 
= 1 for v ~ 10. Also, let v} = 10, v~ = 10, vi = 8, vr = 1 and the allocation mechanism 
used be the uniform price sealed bid auction. Assume that all ties are broken in buyer 1 's 
favor. We know that bi = vf if w; = 1 (a single-unit demander bids equal to his valuation). 
Therefore buyer 1, supposing that vi = br and that vr = br, faces the following expected 
payoff. E1r 1: 
b{ ~ 8, b~ ~ 8, 
P1(10- 8) + P2(10- b~) + P3(10 + 10- 2(1)) b{ ~ 8,8 > b~ ~ 1 
P3(10 + 10- 2(1)) + P2(10- bD 8 > b} ~ 1, 8 > b~ ~ 1 
P1(10- 8) + (P2 + P3)(10- 1) b} ~ 8,b~ < 1 
8 > bi ~ 1' b~ < 1 
b{ < 1, b~ < 1. 
(3.2) 
where P1 = .992, P 2 = 1-.992-.012, and P3 = .01 2. The expected profits for each of the 
six types of strategies in (3.2) are 4.0014,2.16- .0198b~, .1998- .0198b~, 2.1393, .1791 and 
0 respectively for rows 1 - 6. Bidder 1 maximizes expected profit by submitting b}, b~ ~ 8, -
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that is, by choosing a strategy from the first row of (3.2). Each of the other two bidders, 
for whom w; = 1, submits a bid equal to his valuation. Bidder one wins both units and 
pays a per-unit price of 8. The allocation is efficient because the units are obtained by the 
demander(s) to whom they have the greatest value. 
Suppose now that the mechanism utilized is the English clock. If .f. = 0, then q1(0) = 
2, q2(0) = q3 (0) = 1. At price 1 bidder 3 drops his demand from one unit to zero units 
because he does not want to win the unit a.t a price greater than its value to him. This 
leaves total demand at 3 units. At price 1 + f bidder 1 can update his beliefs about the 
other two bidders. Since Prob( vf = 8lvf > 1) = 1, bidder 1 knows that di will equal 8. 
Bidder 1 reasons that his profits, if d~ > 8, would be (10- 8) + (10- 8) = 4. The final price 
would be 8 because bidder 2 is a. single-unit demander with a dominant strategy of truthful 
revelation. If, however, d~ = 1 + f, (bidder 1 reduces his quantity demanded to one unit 
immediately after bidder 3 drops out), his profits are (10- 1- f) = (9- f)> 4, and so he 
drops his demand to one unit a.t price 1 + f. The final allocation is the following: buyers 
one and two each receive a unit and the market price is 1 +f. The allocation is not efficient. 
In example 4, the two mechanisms yield different ex-post revenue. Notice that they also 
do not yield the same expected revenue. There are three other possible configurations of 
demand in the example. They are: 
1) v} = 10,v~ = 10,vf = 1,v{ = 8, 
2) v} = 10, v~ = 10, vf = 1, v{ = 1, 
3) v} = 10, v~ = 10, vf = 8, v{ = 8. 
Case one obtains the same outcome as in example 4 which we have just discussed, but 
with demanders 2 and 3 reversed. In case two, if either type of auction is used then buyer 
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g(v) 
0 1 v 8 10 
Figure 3.1: Probability Density Function for Example 4 
one obtains both units and pays a. per-unit price of 1. In case three, if either type of auction 
is used, buyer one obtains both units and pays a. per-unit price of 8. In all realizations the 
revenue generated by the uniform price sealed bid auction is greater than or equal (and in 
some realizations strictly greater) to that generated by the English clock. Therefore, the 
expected revenue of the uniform price sealed bid auction is greater than that of the English 
clock for the parameters of example 4. 
Example 5: Suppose the distribution from which bidders 2 and 3 draw their va.lua.-
tion(s) is the one whose density function is illustrated in figure 2 in which, 
0 v < 2, 
.5 2 ~ v < 8, 
1 v 2: 8. 
(3.3) 
Bidder 1 draws two valuations from a. distribution in which Prob(vf = v~ = 10) = 1. 
Suppose m = 3, k = 2, w 1 = 2 and w 2 = w3 = 1, the allocation mechanism employed is 
the uniform price sealed bid auction and v} = 10, v~ = 10, vi = 8, vr = 8. Recall that 
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bi = vi = 8 for i E 2, 3. Consider bidder 1 's bids. His expected payoff, E1r 1, equals: 
(P1 + P2)(10 + 10- 2(8)) + P3(10 + 10- 2(2)) b~ 2:: 8, b~ 2:: 8, 
P1(10- 8) + P2(10- bD + P3(10 + 10- 2(2)) b~ 2:: 8, 8 > b~ 2:: 2, 
P3(10 + 10- 2(2)) + P2(10- bD 
P1(10- 8) + (P2 + P3)(10- 2) 
0 
8 > b} 2:: 2, 8 > b~ 2:: 2, 
b1 1 . 1 2:: 8,b2 < 2, 




where P1 = .25, P2 = .5 and P3 = .25. The expected profits of the strategies in the six 
rows of (3.4) are 7, 9.5- .. Sb~, 9- .5b~, 6.5 , 1..5 and 0 respectively. Bidder 1 's best response 
is to submit bf 2:: 8 and b~ = 2 (a strategy from the second row of (3.4)). In the final 
allocation, bidder one receives one unit and either bidder two or three receives the other. 
The allocation is not efficient. 
Suppose the English clock mechanism is employed. If .:r_ = 0, then q1 (0) = 2, q2(0) = 
q3 (0) = 1. At price 2 + E, where E equals the minimum price increment, bidder i notices that 
q2 (0) = q3(0) = 1. This allows bidder 1 to update his beliefs about 2 and 3's valuations. 
He conjectures that vi = vr = 8 and that 8 will be the final price. At this point his best 
response is to reduce his quantity demanded to one unit at a price greater than 8. Since 
di = dr = 8, bidder one receives two units and the final allocation is efficient. 
The English clock yields higher expected revenue ex-ante for the parameters in exam-
ple 5. There are three possible configurations of market demand other than the one we 
discussed. They are: 
1) v} = 10,v~ = 10,v~ = 8,vj = 2, 
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g(v) 
Figure 3.2: Probability Density Function for Example 5 
2) vt = 10, v~ = 10, v~ = 2, v5 = 8, 
3) vt = 10, v~ = 10, v~ = 2, vj = 2. 
Case one obtains the following outcome for both types of auctions: buyers one and two 
each receive a unit and pay a per-unit price of two. In case two the outcome is the same 
as in case one but with demanders two and three reversed. In case three under both types 
of auctions, bidder one receives both units and pays a per-unit price of two. Under all four 
possible configurations of demand, revenue from the English clock is greater than or equal 
to that from the sealed bid auction. In one realization, the revenue from the English clock 
is strictly greater. Therefore the expected revenue of the English clock is strictly greater 
than the uniform price sealed bid auction for the parameters of example 5. 
For example 4, the final allocation from the English clock may not be efficient and the 
expected revenue generated is lower when the English clock is used than when the uniform 
price auction is employed. For example .5, the final allocation from the uniform price sealed 
bid auction may not be efficient and the expected revenue is higher under the English clock 
than under the uniform price sealed bid auction. D 
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3.1.1 Discussion 
In this section we compared generalizations of two common auction forms and incorporated 
the notion of multi-unit demands. We saw that the theoretical strategic isomorphism and 
revenue equivalence results, which hold when demands are single-unit in the independent 
private values environment, do not necessarily hold when demands are multi-unit. The 
difference between the two mechanisms is that the English clock allows demanders to update 
their beliefs about other demanders' valuations while the price is increasing. The extra 
information may lead bidders to behave in ways that either raise or lower revenues and 
efficiency of final allocations when compared to the uniform price sealed bid auction. 
These results certainly do not refute the revenue equivalence theorem. The revenue 
equivalence theorem considers only auctions in which the equilibrium final allocations are 
efficient. With multi-unit demands, since inefficient allocations can occur in equilibrium, 
the revenue equivalence theorem does not apply. However, we have shown that it does not 
necessarily extend to multi-unit demand generalizations of single-unit auctions to which it 
does apply. 
3.2 Experimental Design: Motivation 
This section describes the design of our laboratory experiment in which we investigate 
the revenue and efficiency properties of the two auctions in a variety of conditions. The 
experimental design allows us to contrast the data. along three dimensions: 
1) Sealed Bid vs. English Clock: \ 'Ve have seen in the previous subsection that when 
demanders are playing equilibrium strategies, the two auctions may generate different prices 
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from each other. This suggests that there should also be differences empirically. The nature 
and extent of these differences is of obvious interest to a seller or buyers trying to choose 
an auction form to maximize or minimize revenue or to a planner choosing a mechanism to 
maximize efficiency. 
2) One Shot vs. Repeated Games: In some markets, items are generally sold only 
once, while in other markets similar units of a good are auctioned repeatedly or periodically. 
A seller's or planner's preferred type of auction may differ in the two circumstances. It also 
may be possible for a seller or a planner to choose between a simultaneous and a sequential 
auction to sell multiple identical units. Since a one-shot game and a repeated game in 
which players do not know when the game ends have fundamentally different equilibrium 
properties, the outcome is likely to be different in the two conditions. For these reasons we 
contrast the outcome in one-shot versus repeated games. 
3) Single-Unit vs. Two-Unit Demands: V-/e have seen that when demands are 
multi-unit, demanders, even when behaving non-cooperatively, may have an incentive to 
underreveal their demands. In the experiments we compare outcomes from environments 
in which market demand is identical but in which individual demands are varied. In the 
single-unit demand condition, all demanders have positive valuations for one unit. In the 
two-unit demand condition, all demanders wish to buy two units. In a way, the two-unit 
demanders can be thought of as two one-unit demanders colluding to maximize the sum of 
their individual profits and so the experiments can give insight as to the impact of these 
"cartels" on the market as a whole. 
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3.3 Experimental Design: Environment and Parameters 
3.3.1 Supply and Demand Conditions 
There were 4 units inelastically supplied every period. The distribution of valuations 1( v) 
was uniform from 0 to 1000.1 In the single-unit demand experiments, 6 demanders each 
drew one valuation from 1( v) independently every market period. In the two-unit demand 
condition, 3 demanders drew two valuations from 1( v) every period. 
3.3.2 Information Conditions 
Demanders knew their own two valuations, the distribution of valuations, the supply avail-
able and the number of buyers. They did not know the actual valuations of the other 
buyers. 
3.4 Procedures 
3.4.1 Procedures Common to All Conditions 
The one-shot games consisted of one trading period while the repeated games were divided 
into a series of trading periods. Each subject was given a redemption value sheet at the be-
ginning of each period (see appendix B for samples of the materials distributed to subjects) 
listing the monetary value for which they could redeem from the experimenter any units of 
a commodity acquired during the trading period. To obtain the units, subjects purchased 
1 Valuations were randomly computer generated and then rounded upward to the nearest integer. Partic-
ipants were told that they ha.d an equal chance of drawing any integer value between I and 1000 and that 
the valuations had been generated by a computer before the experiments were run. Valuations were drawn 
independently each period but the same valuations were used for several experimental sessions, enabling the 
experimenter to control for dema.nd draws when ma.king comparisons across the various conditions. 
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Table 3.1: Number of Experiments Conducted for Each Treatment and the Number of 
Market Periods per Experiment 
Treatment Num. Experiments Num. Periods per Expt. 
SB/OS/2U 15 1 
SB/R/2U 4 20 
E/OS/2U 15 1 
E/R/2U 4 20 
SB/OS/1U 6 1 
SB/R/1U 1 10 
E/R/1U 1 10 
them in an auction with cash obtained through an unlimited loan from the experimenter 
for the duration of the experimental session. The profits to the demanders were the sum of 
the differences of the redemption values for the units bought and the prices paid for them. 
All of the experiments were conducted at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics 
and Political Science at the California. Institute of Technology and all of the subjects were 
undergraduates at the California Institute of Technology. The length of the experiments 
for the repeated play conditions averaged 40 minutes for the uniform price auction and 
90 minutes for the English clock. The sessions of one-shot games averaged 15 minutes for 
the sealed bid and 20 minutes for the English clock. Table 3.1 contains some information 
concerning the number of experiments conducted and the number of market periods in each 
experiment. 
The following subsections outline some of the procedures which were specific to certain 
experimental conditions. 
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3.4.2 Specific Procedures 
Uniform Price Auction 
Repeated Play: Subjects could enter bids on their computer terminal. The program then 
indicated to them the per-unit price and how many of their bids were accepted. The 4 
highest bids were accepted and the winners of the units paid a per-unit price equal to the 
5th highest bid. 
One Shot: Each experimental session, subjects filled out by hand their bids on a form 
distributed to them. They were told that they were to be grouped in a market with bidders 
from different experimental sessions. The experimenter played them against these opponents 
at a later date. This procedure was to insure that they could not learn anything about their 
opponents from the practice periods or by any other means. 2 The form can be found in 
appendix B.3. 
English Clock 
This3 experiment was not computerized. \Vhile the experimenter transcribed the informa-
tion on the blackboard, each subject indicated the number of units she demanded at the 
current price. At the beginning of each period, the current price was zero francs. 4 The 
2 Payment and verification were handled in the following way. Subjects were enrolled in an introductory 
economics course. Students in the course could participate in experiments and the money they earned would 
be given to them upon completion of the course . This procedure had been in effect for several years and so 
subjects knew they would actually be paid. 
3 The single-unit demand treatment was only run as a repeated game and not as a one-shot game. The 
one-shot games would have involved many aHditional experiments and in light of the very strong tendency 
for demanders to truthfully bid in the repeated games (even in the first period), and previous experimental 
research, our priors were very strong that we would observe the dominant strategy equilibrium outcomes in 
the one-shot games. 
4 "Francs" is a common name for the experimental currency in terms of which units of commodities are 
valued . Francs are convertible to U.S. dollars at the end of the experimental session at an exchange rate 
known to all participants at the beginning of the experiment. 
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experimenter then allowed the price to rise in small increments until a bidder wished to 
drop a unit from the bidding. The price at which each demander reduced her quantity 
demanded was posted on the board for the remainder of the market period. The clock 
price continued to rise until there were exactly 4 units demanded.5 The remaining bidders 
received the units and paid a per-unit price equal to the price at which the clock stopped. 
The procedure was the same whether the game was played once or repeatedly. 
3.5 Predictions 
3.5.1 Point Predictions 
For the different conditions of this study the current state of knowledge of game theory can 
give us predictions of varying degrees of precision and strength. These are reviewed below 
for the treatments to which they apply. 
Single-Unit Demand 
As we saw in chapter one, in the single-unit demand environment, there always exists a 
symmetric dominant strategy equilibrium with truthful bidding for the uniform price sealed 
bid auction. As we have also seen in chapter one, the dominant strategy equilibrium of the 
uniform price auction has been widely observed in the previous experimental literature. 
For the English clock game there is also a dominant strategy equilibrium in the single-
unit demand environment. In the equilibrium , each demander stays in the bidding until the 
price reaches her valuation and then immediately exits from the bidding. This equilibrium 
5 1£ more than one demander drops out at. the same increment, leaving less than k units demanded, then 
the experimenter backtracks , i .e ., lowers the price until one of the demanders gets back in . 
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Table 3.2: Predicted Average Ex-Post Per-Unit Revenue for the Sealed Bid Auction and 
the English Clock Under Single-Unit Demands (in francs) 
Auction Revenue 
One-Shot Repeated 
Sealed Bid 287 281 
English - 281 
has been observed consistently in previous experimental studies. 
The predicted average ex-post market revenue is given in table 3.2. The revenues differ 
between the one-shot and the repeated games because the actual realizations of market 
demand differ (although the distribution from which demand is drawn is identical) in the two 
conditions. The demand draws in the one-shot games are a subset of those in the repeated 
games. The demand draws for all conditions of our study are displayed in appendix C. The 
predicted revenue is identical across the two auctions, however, because the realizations of 
demand are the same across the two auctions and the revenue occuring in the two respective 
dominant strategy equilibria of the two auctions is identical. Since the units are allocated 
to the demanders with the highest valuations, the allocative efficiency is 100 percent in all 
market periods, where we define the percentage efficiency as the percentage of the maximum 
possible gains from trade realized during a. market period. 
Two-Unit Demand 
In chapter two we characterized symmetric monotone unclominated Bayes-Nash equilibria 
to the uniform price sealed bid auction in the two-unit demand environment. A strictly 
monotone symmetric equilibrium for the experimental parameters is derived in appendix 
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Table 3.3: Predicted Average Ex- Post Per-U nit Revenue and Efficiency for the Sealed Bid 
Auction Under Two-Unit Demands 
Auction Revenue 
One-Shot Repeated 
Revenue (in francs) 84 81 
Efficiency (in percent) 93 93 
C. If all demanders were to play the symmetric equilibrium strategy the average ex-post 
revenue and market efficiency would be as given in table 3.3. 
3.5.2 Predictions of Differences Across Treatments 
Single-Unit Demands vs. Two Unit Demands- We predict that both revenue and 
allocative efficiency will be lower in the two-unit demand environment. The prediction is 
based on the fact that the unilateral incentive for strategic underrevelation exists only in 
the two-unit demand environment . The underrevelation is likely to lead to revenue and 
efficiency less than in the single-unit demand environment. This can be seen for the sealed 
bid auction by consulting tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
Sealed Bid vs. English Clock - We predict revenue equivalence and equal alloca.tive 
efficiency under single-unit demands across the two auctions. However, under two-unit 
demands there seems to be a. strong possibility that both metrics would differ. Since we do 
not have an equilibrium model of the English clock in the two-unit demand environment 
we can not predict higher revenue or a.llocative efficiency for either mechanism. 
One-Shot vs. Repeated - In our repeated games, subjects were not aware which period 
was to be the last. Since the periods were short, at most four minutes, the probability that 
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any given period was the last must have been perceived to be very small. Similarly, due 
to the shortness of the market periods, subjects' discount rates must have been close to 
1. Thus, our repeated game condition may be thought of as an infinitely repeated as well 
as a finitely repeated game. By the Folk theorem, the equilibrium outcomes of the one-
shot games are a subset of the possible equilibrium outcomes in any period of an infinitely 
repeated game. Also, a set of strategies consisting of playing the Nash equilibrium strategy 
in every period of a finitely repeated game constitute a Nash equilibrium of the finitely 
repeated game. 
In previous single-unit demand experimental studies of both types of auctions the dom-
inant strategy equilibrium to the one-shot game has been observed in repeated games. In 
the two-unit demand case, however, it would not surprise us to see different outcomes. In 
particular, it is possible that cooperative behavior among demanders, resulting in prices 
lower than in the non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium outcome of the one-shot game, 
can be sustained in the repeated game. vVe would therefore predict no differences in rev-
enue and ex-post efficiency in the single-unit demand condition but likely differences in the 
two-unit demand condition, with lower per period revenue in the repeated games. 
3.6 Results 
In this section, we report the results of our study. When making some of the inferences 
below, we implicitly assume, by using each period as a data point, that the outcomes in 
each period are independent. This is a plausible assumption only in the one-shot games. 
Nevertheless, we report the same statistics for the repeated games as the one-shot games, 
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because the statistics are useful in making comparisons across treatments. 
Results 1 - 6 are discussed in section 3.6.3. In result 1, we consider the accuracy of 
the point predictions of the game theoretic equilibria discussed in subsection 3.5.1. The 
interesting contrasts across treatments are reported in results 2 - 6. In section 3. 7, some 
observations concerning individual behavior are presented. 
3.6.1 Equilibria 
Our principal observations concerning the validity of the theoretical equilibrium point pre-
dictions for the conditions of our experiment are summarized in result 1. 
Result 1 In the single-unit demand condition, prices are not different than those predicted 
in section 3. 5.1. However, in the two-unit demand uniform price sealed bid auction experi-
ments, prices differ from those occuring in the symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium. 
Support: We reject, using a sign test6 the hypothesis that the observed prices in the two-
unit demand uniform price auction are less than or equal to those occuring in the strictly 
6 The sign test is a procedure for testing hypotheses about the median, call it JL, of a continuous distribu-
tion. If X denotes the random variable whose distribution is under investigation, then P(X::::; JL) = P(X ~ 
JL) = .5. The general null hypothesis has the form flo : IL = J.I·O· 
When JL = 0, any X; is equally likely to be positive or negative. If, however, the true value of JL is much 
greater than 0, we would expect most of the observed X;'s to be positive. Define the test statistic Y = the 
number of X;'s such that X; > 0. For testing Ho, versus Ha : JL > 0, the sign test rejects Ho when the 
test-statistic Y ~ c. If we regard each X; as a trial, and the data consist of a set of n identical trials, and 
if we define a positive X; to be a success and a non-positive X; as a failure, then we have p = P(success) 
= P(X; > 0) = P(X; > IL) = .5. Then , when Ho is true, the statistic Y has a binomial distribution with 
parameters n and p (p = .5). Therefore, if the null hypothesis is Ho : IL = 0 and the alternative hypothesis 
is H a : JL ;f. 0, then we reject H o if either Y ~ c or Y :S ( 11 - c). When p = .5 and n ~ 10 the binomial 
distribution can be approximated by a normal distribution. For our data, in order to compare observed 
revenue to predicted revenue, we let each X; equal the observed revenue minus the predicted revenue in a 
market period . 
To compare relative revenue generated by the two auctions, we let X; equal the observed revenue in the 
uniform price sealed bid auction minus that observed in the English clock . Since we used the same valuations 
for the two mechanisms, the difference should be equal to zero if the mechanisms generate the same revenue 
given the same valuations. Other comparisons across treatments were performed similarly. 
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Table 3.4: Observed Average Ex-Post Per-Unit Revenue: Single-Unit Demands 
Auction Revenue 
One-Shot Repeated 
Sealed Bid 302 ( 6 Periods) 285 ( 10 Periods) 
English - 271 (10 Periods) 
Table 3.5: Observed Average Ex-Post Per- Unit Revenue: Two- Unit Demands 
Auction Revenue 
One-Shot Repeated 
Sealed Bid 310 (15 Periods) 236 ( 80 Periods) 
English 223 ( 15 Periods) 164 (80 Periods) 
monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the two-unit demand one-shot games (p < .05) as well 
as in the repeated games (p < .01). We fail to reject the hypotheses that observed prices 
are equal to those prevailing in the dominant strategy equilibrium for the English clock and 
for the sealed bid auction in the single-unit demand condition (for the pooled data from the 
one-shot and the repeated games) at the 10 percent level. 
3.6.2 Revenue 
In tables 3.4 and 3.5, we summarize the average per-unit franc revenue achieved across 
treatments. Principal observations concerning revenue are summarized in results 2 - 4. 
Result 2 The uniform zn·ice sealed bid auction generated more revenue than the English 
clock in the two-unit demand condition. The two auctions generate the same revenue in the 
single-unit demand condition. 
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Support: A sign test rejects the hypothesis that the revenue generated by the English 
clock is greater than or equal to that generated by the sealed bid auction. The test yields z 
= 1.803 (p < .05) in the one shot, z = 3.16 (p < .001) in the repeated version. The revenues 
generated by the two auctions in the single-unit demand environment are not different from 
each other (p > .1) for the repeated games. 
Result 3 Less revenue was generated per period when the games were repeated than when 
they were played once. 
Support: We reject the hypothesis that revenue from the repeated games is greater than or 
equal to the one-shot games at the (p < .1) level for both auctions in the two-unit demand 
condition. 
Result 4 More revenue was genemted by the English clock under single-unit demand than 
under two-unit demand. 
Support: We reject the hypothesis that revenue under single-unit demands is less than or 
equal to that under two-unit demands at the (p < .01) level for the repeated game condition 
of the English clock. We cannot reject the same hypothesis for the sealed bid auction at 
the 10 percent level. 
3.6.3 Efficiency 
We can also consider levels of efficiency observed in the experiment. When considering the 
levels of efficiency attained it is difficult to describe them as high or low because there is 
no universally agreed upon threshhold, above which allocative efficiency is said to be high 
and below which efficiency is considered to be low. We can, however, compare the observed 
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efficiencies with those which would result if units were distributed randomly among the 
three demanders in the two-unit demand condition, with each demander receiving at most 
two of the four units sold during each market period. 
Result 5 Both types of market m·ganization generate efficiencies higher than random allo-
cations in the two-unit demand condition. 
Support: We reject the hypothesis that the efficiency of the observed allocations are less 
than or equal to the expected efficiency resulting if the 4 units were distributed randomly 
among the demanders in such a way that no demander receives more than two (in the 
two-unit demand condition). The level of significance with which we reject the hypotheses 
are: p < .0001 for the one-shot uniform price auction, p < .005 for the repeated uniform 
price auction, p < .0005 for the one-shot English clock and p < .05 for the repeated play 
version of the English clock. 
In result 6 we consider differences in allocative efficiencies across treatments. 
Result 6 The levels of efficiency attained by the two auction form s are not different from 
each other. There is no difference in the level of efficiency between the one-shot and the 
repeated games. The efficiencies in the single-unit demand experiments are not different 
from those in the two-unit demand experiments. 
Support: The majority of the observed efficiencies are 100 percent in all of the seven 
treatments. A sign test of the differences in efficiencies achieved fails to reject the hypothesis 
that the levels of efficiency of the two types of auction in the two-unit demand conditions 
are equal. z = 0.024,(p-value > .1) for the one-shot game, and z = .47,(p-value > .1) 
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m the repeated games. A sign test of the difference in the efficiency fails to reject the 
hypothesis that the efficiency is the same in the one-shot vs. the repeated games for the 
sealed bid auction and for the English clock in the two-unit demand condition (p > .1 for 
both auctions). We also fail to reject the hypothesis that the efficiencies are the same in 
the one-unit vs. the two-unit demand conditions (p > .1) for all treatments. 
Discussion 
In line with previous experimental research into auctions, we fail to reject the point pre-
dictions of the dominant strategy equilibrium for either type of auction in the single-unit 
demand environment. However, prices are higher than in the symmetric monotone equilib-
rium of the uniform price sealed bid auction in the two-unit demand environment. This is 
consistent with the previous literature in that symmetric Ba.yes-N ash (under risk-neutrality) 
equilibria tend to perform poorly in explaining experimental data. It is possible that the 
high bids are a reflection of risk aversion on the part of demanders or that some demanders 
are having difficulty in determining their best response and therefore bid close to their val-
uations, behaving like price-takers. It may also be the case that the behavior is consistent 
with an asymmetric equilibrium. \.Ve shall examine individual behavior in detail in the next 
subsection. 
In the two-unit demand treatments, the uniform price auction generated significantly 
more revenue than the English clock, suggesting that a seller with several identical units 
to sell simultaneously might prefer to use the uniform price auction to the English clock 
if he has reason to believe that the distribution of demanders' valuations is uniform. It 
seems likely that the difference in revenue is attributable to the iterative property of the 
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English clock mechanism in which many times more messages are sent between buyers. 
Since demanders observe market quantity demanded as the clock price increases, they can 
more easily update their beliefs about other buyers. In this way, the English clock facilitates 
strategic behavior. In the uniform price sealed bid auction, strategic behavior was probably 
more difficult for subjects. We base this assertion on the fact that the rents obtained by 
the seller in the uniform price sealed bid auction exceeded those which would occur in the 
(non-cooperative) symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium. It may be possible that 
the difference in revenue is due to the level of excess demand as suggested by Smith ( 1967) 
or due to the elasticity of demand as suggested by Miller and Plott (1985). It is beyond the 
scope of this project to compare these theories. 
Another clear result which emerges from the data is that the repeated play version 
generates lower revenue per period. This is indicative of some type of learning or experience 
effect in which buyers in later periods improve their extraction of surplus from the seller. 
Game theory suggests that more cooperative behavior (buyers submitting lower bids) can 
be a non-cooperative equilibrium in a repeated game when the final period is unknown. 
Indeed, more cooperative behavior on the part of players seems to be observed than in the 
one-shot game. Our empirical evidence suggests that a. seller may be better off if he can 
lead buyers to believe that they are playing a one-shot game. Two open questions are 1) 
whether, in a multi-unit demand setting, he should bundle all of the units he has and sell 
them all at one time and 2) whether he should tell demanders exactly how many periods 
will be played. 
We found that the English clock generated less revenue in the two-unit demand condition 
than in the single-unit demand condition, but that the uniform price auction did not. At 
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first glance this seems somewhat surprising. A complete explanation is not possible since 
we have no reason to suppose that the revenues of the two auctions should be equal in the 
two-unit demand environment and there is no satisfactory equilibrium model of the English 
clock in multi-unit demand environments. It seems likely that the difference between the 
one-unit and two-unit revenues in the English clock was due to strategic behavior. We 
believe that the difference was not observed for the sealed bid auction because strategic 
behavior was more difficult . 
Both of the mechanisms generate allocations which are more efficient than algorithms 
which allocate the units randomly even in the two-unit demand conditions. Both mecha-
nisms realize most of the gains from trade despite the possibility of inefficiencies resulting 
from strategic behavior . 
The equal efficiencies generated by the two auctions under single-unit demands was 
expected considering the results of previous work and the very strong theoretical predictions. 
The equality of efficiency under two-unit demands is somewhat surprising, especially in light 
of the different revenues in the one-unit and the two-unit demand conditions and across the 
two auctions. It seems that even though subjects behaved strategically and manipulated 
market prices in their favor, they still preserved for the most part the efficient allocations 
which would result in a competitive equilibrium. The ordinal ranking of bids remained 
the same as the ordinal ranking of valuations . The evidence suggests that the multi-unit 
demands do not have a strong tendency to lower efficiency levels, even in a very thin market. 
However, we concede th a t repli cation is needed to confirm our results, because we used only 
one set of parameters and th ere is considerable previous evidence (Miller and Plott (1985), 
and Smith (1967), for example ) which suggests that relative revenue generating properties 
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of different auctions depend on the particular parameters of the market. 
In the next subsection we further analyze the data at the individual level. 
3.6.4 Individual Behavior 
Uniform Price Auction 
We can assign all bidding strategies in the two-unit demand condition to one of four ex-
haustive and mutually exclusive classes . The first two classes are very restrictive7 while the 
last two are very large. 
Strategy 1: Bidders use the strictly monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Recall that 
the equilibrium strategy involves each bidder submitting a bid equal to his valuation on his 
more highly-valued unit, and underbidding on his lower-valued unit. 
Strategy 2: Bidders behave as price takers. They bid their valuations for two units. If 
all bidders follow this strategy, the competitive outcome results. 
Strategy 3: U ndominated: These are all strategies other than strategies 1 and 2 that 
are not dominated by another strategy. This group includes all strategies which involve both 
a higher bid equal to the higher valuation and a lower bid less than or equal to the lower 
valuation. This is the also the set of rationalizable strategies. 
Strategy 4: Dominated: This group encompasses all other strategies. Any strategy 
that involves underbidding on the higher-valued unit is dominated by a strategy in which 
the demander bids his valuation on the higher unit. Any strategy which includes a bid 
greater than a demander's valuation for either unit is dominated by a strategy in which 
7 We will say that a bidding st.rat.egy is in one of the first two classes if the bid is less than 1 cent away 
from the exact bidding function specified by the st.rat.egy. 
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Table 3.6: Demanders' Strategies in the Two- Unit Demand Uniform Price Auction 
Strat. 1 Strat. 2 Strat. 3 Strat 4 
One Shot 3.6 29.6 12.3 54.5 
Repeated Periods 1-10 6.6 20.0 12.3 61.1 
Repeated Periods > 10 7.2 30.0 19.5 43.3 
demander instead bids his valuation. In table 3.6 we report the percentage of the time that 
the four types bidding strategies were observed. 
Very few subjects used the symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy. This 
result is not unanticipated as the equilibrium bidding function is difficult to calculate and 
is only a best response if it is being used by all of the other bidders. Over one quarter of 
the bidders submitted bids equal to their two valuations. It is a strategy which is easy to 
calculate and is also a natural focal point. Roughly 15 percent of the time, bidders used 
other strategies which would be undominated in a one-shot game. 
More than half of the time, bidders followed strategies which are dominated in one-shot 
games. However, bidders were less likely to follow dominated strategies as they played the 
game longer in the repeated games, suggesting that they were "learning" which strategies 
were dominated. The fact that high efficiencies were nonetheless achieved in the auction 
suggests that use of dominated strategies did not. affect the ordinal ranking of the bids in 
the market. The persistence of dominated strategies in conjunction with the high observed 
efficiencies hints that the players using dominated strategies did not lose much by using the 
strategies, i.e., they were not often punished for their actions. 
Let us consider more precisely the nature of the strategies which demanders were using . 
in the experiment. In tables 3.7 and 3.8 we give the number of times each of nine possible 
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Table 3.7: Demanders' Strategies in the Uniform Price Auction (One-Shot Games, Number 
of 0 bservations) 
b2 < V2 b2 = v2 b2 > v2 
b1 < VJ 13 2 1 
b1 =VI 7 13 1 
b1 > VJ 1 0 7 
Table 3.8: Demanders' Strategies in the Uniform Price Auction (Repeated Games, Number 
of Observations) 
b2 < v2 b2 = V2 b2 > V2 
b1 <VI 51 4 10 
b1 = VJ 53 60 9 
b1 > VJ 2 8 43 
subfamilies of strategies were used. n = 45 and n = 240 for tables 3. 7 and 3.8 respectively. 
The most striking feature in the two tables is the concentration of the data along the 
diagonal from upper left to the lower right. By far the two most frequently observed types 
of dominated strategies were underbidding on both units, and overbidding on both units. 
The relatively high number of players overbidding on both units indicates that final 
prices were not high enough to cause the overbidders to lose money. In fact, in none of 
the one-shot games did any player actually receive negative profits during a market period. 
The high incidence of the strategies (b1 > v1 ,b2 > v2) and (b1 < v1,b2 < v2) hints at a 
type of asymmetric "equilibrium" behavior in that the players who are underbidding have 
little incentive to increase their bids if they are playing against overbidders, because the 
increase in bid does not increase appreciably the probability of receiving units. Similarily, 
if other players are underbidding, the overbidders receive units at lower prices than those 
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Table 3.9: Demanders' Strategies in the English Clock with Two-Unit Demands 
At Value Less than Value Greater than Value 
One Shot 42.3 53.8 3.9 
Repeated Periods 1-10 27.3 70.3 2.4 
Repeated Periods > 10 17.1 82.9 0 
Table 3.10: Demanders' Strategies in the English Clock with Single-Unit Demands 
At Value Less than Value Greater than Value 
Repeated Periods 1-5 93.3 6.7 0 
Repeated Periods > 5 96.7 3.3 0 
that would prevail if the underbidders followed undominated strategies. The overbidders, 
then, have little incentive to change their strategies. 
English Clock 
When analyzing the data froin the English Clock, it is not possible to identify the strategies 
which demanders are following because the dropout points which are higher than the final 
price are not observable. However, we can examine the dropout points observed8 and check 
whether demanders tended to drop out at prices less than, equal to, or greater than their 
valuations. In table 3.9, we list the percentage of the time each strategy was followed on 
a demander's lower-valued unit in the two-unit demand condition. For comparison, the 
strategies followed in the single-unit demand condition are given in table 3.10. 
Note the sharp contrast between the two conditions. There is a strong tendency for 
8 The table includes only the observations where it could be ascertained which of the three strategies were 
being used. 
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demanders to bid truthfully in the single-unit demand condition, even in the early periods. 
In the two-unit demand condition however, well over half of the subjects underrevealed 
on their lower-valued unit. The tendency toward underrevelation became stronger the 
more periods that subjects had played, suggesting that subjects were learning to drop their 
lower-valued units in order to lower the price they paid on their higher-valued units. This 
underrevelation was not reflected in low efficiencies but was reflected in the low revenues 
generated by the clock. 
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Chapter 4 
Summary and Concluding 
Remarks 
In chapter two we generalized some important theoretical properties of the uniform price 
sealed bid auction to an independent private values environment with two-unit demands. 
We considered a class of bidding functions called type M, essentially a general type of 
monotonicity. A necessary condition for a bidding function to be a type M symmetric un-
dominated Bayes- Nash equilibrium was derived. The dominant strategy equilibrium of the 
single-unit demand environment clearly obeys the necessary conditions. In any equilibrium, 
there is underbidding for each demander's lower valued unit, as demanders, while still be-
having non-cooperatively, underreveal demand in an attempt to shift the market price in 
their favor. An interesting property of type M equilibria, separability, is also obtained. 
A sufficient condition for a solution to the necessary conditions to be an equilibrium is 
also deduced and an example of an equ ilibrium is provided. As the number of bidders gets 
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large, the underrevelation in equilibrium converges to zero. It is perhaps not surprising that 
bidders exhibit an increasing tendency to behave like price takers as the market becomes 
thicker and each bidder's ability to affect the market price declines. 
In chapter three we compared generalizations of two common auction forms and incorpo-
rated the notion of multi -unit demands. We saw that the theoretical strategic and revenue 
equivalence results, which hold when demands are single-unit in the independent private 
values environment, do not necessarily hold when they are multi-unit. We then examined 
outcomes from a set of laboratory experiments. In the experiments, where there was a 
uniform distribution of valuations, we observed that the uniform price auction generated 
more revenue than the English clock in the two-unit demand condition, suggesting that a 
revenue maximizing seller ma.y want to use the uniform price auction rather than the En-
glish clock in environments similar to the two-unit demand experimental environment. We 
also found that less revenue was generated when the auctions were played repeatedly than 
when they were played only once. We conclude, citing both theoretical and experimental 
evidence, that in multi-unit demand environments the two mechanisms are fundamentally 
different from each other. This result contrasts sharply with much of the previous theoret-
ical and experimental literature concerning single-unit demand independent private values 
environments . 
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Appendix A 
Additional Lemmas 
Lemma 10 If all n players besides bidder· i use a bidding function that is type M and 
undominated, then fv(x) > 0 fm· 0:::; x :::; B2(v, v). 
Proof: Recall that F 11 equals Prob(At least f bidders make 2 bids that are less than or 
equal to x, at least m + e bidders make at least 1 bid that is less than or equal to x) 
Consider the probability that a randomly chosen bidder makes 2 bids that are less than 
or equal to x which is given by: 
(A.l) 
The term in the last equation follows from the fact that if B is undominated, that b¥ = vf 2: 
v~ 2: B 2 ( vf, v~) (bidding an amount higher than one's valuation is dominated). The term 
is clearly strictly increasing in x if B is type M and undominated for x such that 0 ~ x ~ v. 
Now consider the probability that a randomly chosen bidder makes at least one bid that is 
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less than or equal to x, which equals: 
(A.2) 
The last term results from the fact that underbidding on the higher valued unit is dominated 
by bidding an amount equal to the higher valuation and from the fact that vf ~ v~. This 
last equation is also strictly increasing in x for all x such that 0 ~ x ~ v. It follows that 
Fv( x) is strictly increasing in x and that fv ( x) > 0; 0 ~ x ~ B 2 (v, v). 0 
Lemma 11 E-rri ,B is twice differentiable. 
Proof: By assumption 1 E C 2 • 
Since g( VI, v2) E Cl, JC: fcJ g( VI, v2)dv2dv1 is twice differentiable with respect to x and 
y (for a reference see 11Iarsden pp. 285-286) and thus continuous in x andy (Marsden pp. 
161-162). 
It follows that H(x, y, G, n, m., e), the product of twice differentiable functions, is twice 
differentiable with respect to x and y (see Marsden pg. 171) and thus continuous in x and 
y. 
Now consider Fv(x) = L~~v Lf,m;2f+m=q H(x, {3- 1(x),G,n,m,f). Fv(x) is twice differ-
entiable in x since the sum of differentiable functions is differentiable, (Marsden pg. 199). 
This implies that fv( x) is differentiable and continuous in x. 
The expected profit is given in equation (2.43). E7ri is differentiable in bi and b~ because 
an anti-derivative of a continuous function is differentiable (Marsden pg. 286). 
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Clearly, both of the expressions are differentiable in bi and b~. We have now shown that 
E1ri(bL b~) is twice differentiable. D 
APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMS 81 
Appendix B 
Experimental Instructions and 
Forms 
In this appendix we include sample instructions for both the English clock and the uniform 
price sealed bid auction experiments, a sample redemption value sheet, and a sample bid 
form for the one-shot uniforrn price auction. In section B.l are the instructions common 
to both the the English clock and the uniform price sealed bid auction experiments. The 
instructions for the two experiments were identical except for the part entitled "The Auction 
Process," the text of which is given in section B.2 for the English clock, and in section B.3 
for the uniform price sealed bid auction. Figures B.l and B.2, which are in section B.4, 
contain the sample redemption value sheet and the sample bid form respectively. 
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B.l Instructions Common to All Experiments 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. The instructions are 
simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a consid-
erable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. 
The experiment will be broken up into a series of trading periods in which you will 
make decisions. At the beginning of each period, you will be given a Record Sheet. The 
Record Sheet describes the value to you of a fictitious commodity which you can purchase 
in the market. Your Record Sheet is your own private information. You are not to reveal 
its contents to anyone. 
The currency used in this market is francs. All trading will be in terms of francs. Your 
final payoff will be in terms of dollars. The conversion rate is .. ... francs to one dollar. You 
will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
Each buyer has .... value(s) on his Redemption Value Sheet. Each value is equally likely 
to be any integer between 1 and 1000. If you have more than one value, your values are 
ordered on the Redemption Value Sheet from highest to lowest. 
You can obtain units of the commodity by participating in the market process which is 
described below. There are ... units to be sold in each market period. 
The Auction Process 
Earnings 
Please refer to your record sheet to determine your earnings. Your earnings for the period 
are the redemption values of the units you receive minus the total of the prices you paid 
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for them. For the first unit that you buy in the trading period marked at the top of the 
page, you will receive the amount listed in row (1) marked 1st Unit Redemption Value. 
If you buy a second unit during the same trading period, you will receive the additional 
amount listed in line (4) marked Second Unit Redemption Value, etc ... The profits from 
each purchase, which are yours to keep, are computed by taking the difference between the 
redemption value and purchase price of the unit bought. That is, 
YOUR EARNINGS= REDEMPTION VALUE- PURCHASE PRICE 
Suppose for example, that you buy two units and that your redemption value for the 
first unit is 200 and for the second unit is 180. If you pay a per-unit price of 150, your 
earnings are: 
Earnings From First = 200 - 150 = .so 
Earnings From Second = 180 - 150 = 30 
Total Earnings = .so + 30 = 80 
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The purchase price of the 
first unit you buy should be recorded on row (2). You should then record the profit on the 
purchase as directed on row (3). At the end of the period, record the total profit on the 
last row of the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly. 
There will be a practice period at the beginning of the experiment. If you have any 
question concerning the experiment, please raise your hand. 
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B.2 Specific Instructions for the English Clock 
The Auction Process 
Each period, you will be grouped with .... other participants. There will be .... of these 
groups. Each of the groups will be in a separate market, that is, they will be bidding on a 
different set of units. You will be in the same group for several periods. The experimenter 
will inform you if there is a change in the members of the group. There will be .... units 
available to each group each period. 
You can obtain these units by participating in an ascending price auction. The auction 
proceeds as follows. At the beginning of a period, a "low" price will be posted. You will 
then be asked to submit a request specifying how many units you would like at that price. 
If the total number of units requested is more than the number of units available, the price 
is increased. 
Suppose, for example, that a per-unit price of 50 is posted on the board and there are 
4 units available to be sold to 3 buyers. Suppose that each of the three buyers requests 
2 units. Notice that at the price of 50 there is an overdemand for units. That is, at this 
price total requests are more than the 4 units available. Since the total amount requested 
is greater the number of units available, the price will be increased and new requests must 
be submitted. 
The price is now increased to 60 francs and new requests are submitted. The only 
restriction placed on a participant 's new request after a price increase is that the number of 
units requested must be less than or equal to his number of units requested at the previous 
price. 
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The price will continue to increase as long as total orders are greater than the number 
of units available. The price will stop increasing if total orders equal the number of units 
available. If a price increase results in total requests of less than the number of units 
available , then the price will be reduced until a price where total requests equal that number 
is found. This final price will be the per-unit price charged. 
B.3 Specific Instructions for the Uniform Price Sealed Bid 
Auction 
The Auction Process 
Each period, you will be grouped with .... other participants . There will be .... of these 
groups. Each of the groups will be in a separate market, that is, they will be bidding on a. 
different set of uni ts . You will be in the same group for several periods. The experimenter 
will inform you if there is a change in the members of the group. There will be .... units 
available to each group each period. 
During each period you may submit bids for units of the commodity by filling out a bid 
form which will appear on your computer screen at the beginning of the period. The bid 
form has slots for ten bids but you will not be allowed to fill in more than .... bid(s). To fill 
out the bid form, just put the amount of your bid in the column labeled bid per unit and 
enter a 1 in the column labeled number of units. 
Once you have filled out your form, you must submit it to the market. Once all partic-
ipants have submitted their bids, all of the bids will be ranked from highest to lowest. The 
highest ... . bids in each group will be accepted and receive the .... units awarded to the 
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group. The per unit price for all of the accepted bids is equal to the highest rejected bid, 
that is, the .. . th highest bid in the group. If there is a tie for the lowest accepted bid, the 
unit( s) is randomly assigned to the tied buyers . Notice that if you have a bid accepted, the 
price you pay for that unit will never be more than what you have bid. 
B.4 Forms 
On the next page is a sample redemption value sheet . On the following page is the form 
used in the one period uniform price auction experiments . 
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Figure B.2: Bid Form For One Period Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction 
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Appendix C 
Experimental Parameters 
In this appendix we solve for a symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium for our exper-
imental parameters. The appendix also includes two tables, in which are shown the exact 
valuations which demanders had in the experiments, as well as some details concerning our 
procedures. 
C.l Bayes-Nash Equilibrium for the Experimental Param-
eters 
For our experiment n + 1 = 3, k = 4, and 1(v) is uniform. From theorem 1, we know 
that any equilibrium requires ,81(vi) = v1 and ,82(v) = v. We also know that .82(v2) must 
satisfy equation (2 .6) We can ca.Icula.te F2n-k+I(b2)- F2n-k+2(b2), which for the example 
is F1 (b2)- F2 (b2 ), the probability that two randomly drawn bidders make a total of exactly 
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Solving for v;, we obtain: 
(C.5) 
There are many solutions that obey the initia l conditions of theorem 1, i.e. that ,82(1) = I. 
Only one solution is strictly monotone in the (0 ,1) interval and it is depicted in figure C.l. 
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The second order condition is the following : 
We have verified that the last equation is satisfied by the solution depicted in the graph. 
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Table C.l: Demanders' Valuations in the Two-Unit Demand Condition 
Demand Draw Demander 
1 2 3 
v} v} vi vi vr v~ 
1 886 866 696 118 936 222 
2 818 377 997 108 299 128 
3 486 300 598 121 210 15 
4 723 204 738 697 825 694 
5 694 557 496 333 987 726 
6 571 424 882 583 587 448 
7 793 777 804 51 803 508 
8 422 188 985 127 635 440 
9 877 343 369 364 722 75 
10 977 37 788 652 145 118 
11 813 741 439 431 953 665 
12 897 792 69 49 877 569 
13 676 502 472 288 842 99 
14 695 358 870 463 132 11 
15 978 586 927 864 786 157 
16 395 6 914 591 253 180 
17 102 13 850 155 772 473 
18 915 105 632 195 838 719 
19 727 628 830 650 241 110 
20 667 241 331 24 812 183 
C.2 Valuations 
Tables C.l and C.2 indicate the value to subjects, in terms of "francs", the experimental 
currency, of obtaining the commodity trading in our experimental market. 
In each of the eight two-unit demand repeated play experiments, all twenty demand 
draws were used. In four of the experiments, i.e. two English clock and two sealed bid 
auction experiments, the demand draws 1, ... ,20 were used in periods 1, .. 20 respectively. 
In the other four two-unit demand repeated play experiments, draws 11-20 were used in 
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Table C.2: Demanders' Valuations in the Single-Unit Demand Condition 
Demand Draw Demander 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
vl v2 v3 v4 vs v6 
1 866 886 118 696 936 222 
2 377 818 997 108 299 128 
3 486 300 121 598 15 210 
4 204 723 697 738 825 694 
5 557 694 333 496 987 726 
6 571 424 583 882 448 587 
7 777 793 804 51 803 508 
8 422 188 98.5 127 440 635 
9 343 877 364 369 75 722 
10 977 37 652 788 118 145 
market periods 1 - 10, and draws 1 - 10 were used in market periods 11-20. There were 
30 one-shot games with two-unit demands, 15 using each type of auction. Each of demand 
draws 1 - 15 was used in one game for each type of auction. 
In each of the two repeated play single-unit demand experiments demand draws 1, ... ,10 
were used in markets periods 1, ... ,10 respectively. In the six one-shot single-unit demand 
experiments demand draws 1 - 6 were used. 
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